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FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 2-1, *Intelligence Operations*, builds on the doctrinal foundation established in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 2, *Intelligence* (7 June 1997), and provides the higher order tactics, techniques, and procedures for Marine Corps intelligence operations. Designed for commanders and other users of intelligence as well as intelligence personnel who are responsible for planning and executing intelligence operations, MCWP 2-1 details the:

- Fundamentals of intelligence operations
- Interrelationship of the intelligence functions with the Marine Corps maneuver warfare philosophy and supporting command and control
- Operational and planning considerations for the conduct of intelligence planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, production, dissemination, and utilization
- Concept of MAGTF intelligence operations, including roles, responsibilities, and capabilities of intelligence sections, units, and organizations
- Challenges and considerations for providing effective intelligence support across the range of military operations within joint and multinational operations and for supporting the Marine Corps operational concepts of operational maneuver from the sea, sustained operations ashore, and military operations other than war.

2. SUPERSESSION

MCWP 2-1 supersedes Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 3-20, *Commander's Guide to Intelligence* (6 February 1991).

3. SENIORITY

Substantial developmental efforts are under way throughout the Marine Corps intelligence doctrinal hierarchy. The target date for completion of all new and revised intelligence-series doctrinal publications is the summer of 1999. Pending completion of this task, in the event of

terminology, conceptual, operational, or other conflicts between MCWP 2-1 and any current publications within the FMFM 3-2X series, MCWP 2-1 takes precedence.

#### 4. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CHANGES

Recommendations and changes for improving this publication are invited from commands as well as directly from individuals. Forward suggestions using the user suggestion format via either of the following means:

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Recommendations should include the following information:

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#### 5. OBTAINING ADDITIONAL COPIES

Additional printed copies of MCWP 2-1 may be obtained from Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA 31704-5001, by following the instructions in MCBul 5600, *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications Status*. Electronic copies may be obtained from the Doctrine Division, MCCDC, worldwide web homepage which is found at the following universal reference locator (letters in lower case): **<http://138.156.107.3/docdiv>**.

#### 6. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

- The proponent for MCWP 2-1 is Doctrine Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command

- Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both men and women are included.

## 7. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

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# Intelligence Operations

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## Chapter 1

# Fundamentals

*“However absorbed a commander may be in the elaboration of his own thoughts, it is sometimes necessary to take the enemy into account.”*

— Winston Churchill

### 1001. What Is Intelligence?

Intelligence is knowledge of the battlespace and of the threat forces in that battlespace. Knowledge is generated in support of the commander’s decisionmaking process and is the result of the collection, processing, exploitation, evaluation, integration, analysis, and interpretation of available information about the battlespace and threat.

### 1002. Objectives of Intelligence

Intelligence has two objectives. The first objective is to reduce uncertainty by providing accurate, timely, and relevant knowledge about the threat and the surrounding environment. The second objective is to assist in protecting friendly forces through counterintelligence (CI).

#### a. Reducing Uncertainty

Uncertainty pervades the battlespace—it is a fundamental attribute of war. First and foremost, intelligence should support the commander’s decisionmaking process by reducing uncertainty about the hostile situation. To achieve this objective, intelligence should accomplish four specific actions. First, it should identify and evaluate existing conditions and capabilities. Second, on the basis of those existing conditions and capabilities, it should estimate possible enemy courses of action (COAs) and provide insight into possible future actions. Third, it should aid in identifying friendly

vulnerabilities that the threat may exploit. Finally, intelligence should assist in the development and evaluation of friendly COAs. The fog and friction of war will never allow the commander to have a perfect picture of the battlespace. Because intelligence deals with the greatest number of unknowns—questions about an unfamiliar area and a hostile enemy who is actively trying to conceal information about his forces and intentions—there will almost always be gaps in intelligence, and the knowledge provided will lack the desired degree of detail and reliability. Intelligence cannot provide absolute certainty; rather, intelligence attempts to reduce the uncertainty facing the commander to a reasonable level by collecting relevant information, placing it in context to provide knowledge, and conveying it in the form of images to enhance understanding.

#### b. Counterintelligence

Within the Marine Corps, CI constitutes active and passive measures intended to deny a threat force valuable information about the friendly situation, to detect and neutralize hostile intelligence collection, and to deceive the enemy as to friendly capabilities and intentions. It denies threat forces information that might increase the effectiveness of hostile operations against friendly forces. In so doing, CI increases uncertainty for the enemy, thereby making a significant contribution to the success of our operations. CI also identifies friendly vulnerabilities, evaluates security measures, and assists in implementing appropriate plans to enhance force protection against the threats of sabotage, subversion, and terrorism.



## 1003. Intelligence and Maneuver Warfare

### a. The Nature of War

The essence of war is a violent clash between independent wills, each trying to impose itself on the other. War's defining attributes of friction, uncertainty, fluidity, disorder, and complexity combine with the various dimensions of human nature to make war a fundamentally unpredictable activity. To succeed in war, we must be able to operate effectively in this uncertain, chaotic, complex, and fluid environment.

### b. Maneuver Warfare

The Marine Corps philosophy for winning under these conditions is a warfighting doctrine that is based on rapid, flexible, and opportune maneuver. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, *Warfighting*, states that, "Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope."

Maneuver warfare requires maneuver in both time and space to achieve superiority over the enemy. Maneuver warfare concentrates on those actions that present the enemy with a series of dilemmas in which events happen unexpectedly and faster than the enemy can react. Concepts central to the execution of maneuver warfare are:

- **Orienting on the enemy.** Maneuver warfare attacks the enemy "system," the combination of physical, moral, and mental components that make up an enemy or an enemy force. It requires an understanding of the unique characteristics that make the enemy system function so that we can penetrate the system, tear it apart, and, if necessary, destroy the isolated elements. This means focusing outward on the particular characteristics of the enemy.

- **Centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.** Centers of gravity are sources of moral or physical strength, power, or resistance that are critical to the enemy's ability to resist. Critical vulnerabilities are components of the enemy system that are both crucial to the functioning of the system and vulnerable to exploitation. Identification and exploitation of an enemy's centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities help us to focus combat power toward a decisive aim.
- **Main effort.** The main effort is the unit assigned responsibility for accomplishing the key mission within the command. It is directed where there is the best opportunity for success and at the object that will have the most significant effect on the enemy, normally a critical vulnerability.
- **Commander's intent.** Intent describes the purpose behind the task assigned in a mission. The intent provides continuing guidance when the situation changes and permits the exercise of initiative in harmony with the commander's desires.
- **Mission tactics.** Mission tactics assign subordinates a task without specifying how it must be accomplished. They permit subordinates to exercise initiative in adapting to an ever-changing situation.
- **Tempo.** Tempo is used to keep the enemy off balance, thereby increasing his friction. Speed, initiative, and flexibility generate and maintain a tempo that the enemy cannot match.

### c. The Role of Intelligence


Accurate and timely intelligence is a prerequisite for success in maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare is based on a firm focus on the enemy and on taking action that avoids enemy strengths and exploits critical enemy vulnerabilities. It means acting in a manner and at a time and place that the enemy does not expect and for which he is not prepared. It requires decision and action based on situational awareness—a keen understanding of the factors that make each situation unique. Intelligence provides the knowledge of the enemy and the battlespace that permits the commander to reduce uncertainty, identify opportunities for success, assess risk, outline intent, and make decisions that provide

focus, generate speed and tempo, and achieve decisive results.

## 1004. Developing Intelligence


### a. Data, Information, and Intelligence

Intelligence is not simply another term for information. Intelligence is more than an element of data or a grouping of information; it is a body of knowledge. Knowledge occupies a unique place in the information hierarchy, which is a framework used to distinguish between various classes of information. (See figure 1-1.) There is a clear and important distinction between raw data, information, and intelligence. Intelligence is not a mass of unfocused data or even a collection of related facts. In fact, giving a commander every piece of data that we have without providing meaning can increase uncertainty by overloading the commander with incomplete, contradictory, or irrelevant information. To be considered intelligence, data must be placed in context to provide an accurate and meaningful image of the hostile situation. Intelligence is developed by analyzing and synthesizing data and information to produce knowledge about the threat and the environment. The commander combines this knowledge with knowledge of the friendly situation and employs experience, judgment, and intuition to understand the situation. The commander then applies this understanding in making decisions.



### Figure 1-1. The Information Hierarchy. b. The Intelligence Development Process

Intelligence is the output of a process that converts data and information into knowledge that is applicable to a specific military decision. The process used to develop intelligence is called the intelligence cycle. (See figure 1-2.)



**Figure 1-2. The Intelligence Cycle.**

The intelligence cycle consists of a series of related activities that translate the need for intelligence about a particular aspect of the battlespace or threat into a knowledge-based product that is provided to the commander for use in the decisionmaking cycle. In this sequence, intelligence needs are identified and a plan is developed for satisfying those needs. Data are collected, processed into information, and converted into intelligence through analysis and synthesis. The resulting knowledge is then provided to the commander as an intelligence product that is used in making decisions.

The information used to produce intelligence is derived from a variety of sources. Intelligence information, that is, information used to generate intelligence, is commonly drawn from three types of data:

- Intelligence data—data derived from assets primarily dedicated to intelligence collection, for

example, imagery systems, electronic intercept equipment, human intelligence (HUMINT) sources, and so on

- Sensor data—data derived from sensors whose primary mission is surveillance or target acquisition, for example, air surveillance radars, counter-battery radars, and remote ground sensors
- Combat data—data derived from reporting by operational units.

Because of their highly perishable or critical nature, combat data and sensor data are sometimes used to effect decisions without being converted into intelligence. Although the demands of the ongoing battle may require rapid action, decisions based on raw, unprocessed data or single pieces of data should be avoided, if possible. The processing, analysis, and synthesis of data and information into intelligence can be accomplished rapidly and at all levels. We seek knowledge—*accurate intelligence, not incomplete, unfocused, or unevaluated information*—with which to enhance our understanding and on which to base our decisions. The intelligence cycle works continuously to satisfy intelligence shortfalls and confirm or refute fragmentary information.

Once collected and processed, information is converted into intelligence through the application of experience and judgment. In this step, information is analyzed to determine its significance and is synthesized with other relevant information to build a coherent picture of existing conditions and capabilities. This picture is then used to predict possible outcomes of environmental conditions and enemy actions. The results of this step are conveyed to the commander in an intelligence product. Because humans understand situations best as images—mental pictures—intelligence is produced and disseminated in graphic form whenever possible. The process is completed when the knowledge provided is applied to influence decisionmaking.

## 1005. Intelligence Operations

Intelligence personnel and organizations perform a number of separate and distinct activities and functions

that are collectively known as intelligence operations. Intelligence operations are conducted to provide intelligence in support of the decisionmaking process of commanders down to the small-unit level. The primary focus of Marine Corps intelligence operations is the generation of *tactical intelligence*, that is, intelligence that supports the planning and conduct of tactical actions.<sup>1</sup> Intelligence reduces uncertainty and supports the decisionmaking process by:

- Describing the battlespace
- Identifying key factors in the battlespace that can influence operations
- Defining and evaluating threat capabilities
- Identifying the enemy's center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities
- Assessing enemy intentions.

### a. Relationship to Command and Control (C2)

Intelligence is a fundamental component of C2. C2 is the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. A principal aim of C2 is to enhance the commander's ability to make sound and timely decisions. Intelligence facilitates the commander's decisionmaking process by making a major contribution to the understanding of the battlespace and the threat. Intelligence is also an integral element of the process through which the commander implements decisions. Inadequate or imperfect intelligence can significantly inhibit the ability of a commander or subordinates to carry out these decisions. Lack of a continuous, effective intelligence effort also degrades the quality of feedback to the commander about the unfolding situation; it is this feedback that allows the commander to modify the actions of the command as needed.

*Because intelligence is crucial to success on the battlefield, it must be given command attention.* The commander drives intelligence by focusing the intelligence effort through the definition of the mission, articulation

<sup>1</sup> Although the focus is on tactical intelligence, the Marine Corps must draw on both strategic and operational intelligence resources and, in certain circumstances, be prepared to conduct intelligence operations at the operational and even strategic level.

of intent, and designation of priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). A PIR is an intelligence requirement (IR) associated with a decision that will critically affect the overall success of the command's mission. PIRs are a subset of commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) and are focused on the environment and the threat.<sup>2</sup>

## b. Relationship to Operations

*"Intelligence drives operations."*

— Gen A.M. Gray  
29th Commandant of the Marine Corps

Intelligence is inseparable from operations. General Gray's statement is often used to highlight this relationship. Intelligence drives operations by *shaping* the planning and execution of operations. It provides a menu of factors that the commander considers when making a decision. Specifically, intelligence:

- Identifies potential advantages offered by the environment
- Describes limitations imposed by the environment
- Ascertains and assesses enemy strengths to be avoided
- Uncovers enemy vulnerabilities that can be exploited
- Recommends COAs based on factors of the battlespace and threat
- Enables rapid decisionmaking and the generation and maintenance of tempo.

Operational actions develop logically from intelligence. A commander with effective intelligence knows the nature of the terrain, weather conditions, the composition and status of the infrastructure in the area of operations, the makeup and attitude of the population that will be encountered, and how the combined effects of these

factors will influence mission accomplishment. Intelligence provides knowledge of threat capabilities, strengths, centers of gravity, and critical vulnerabilities, along with insight into the enemy's intentions. The integration of intelligence on the threat and on the battlespace helps to provide the commander with situational awareness, which is used to determine the decisive time and place to strike.

Intelligence and operations must be linked throughout the planning, decision, execution, and assessment (PDE&A) cycle at all levels. Intelligence shapes the plan and provides the knowledge that facilitates execution. It identifies changes in the situation that require modification of the plan or that trigger decisions during the conduct of the operation. At the same time, the nature of the mission and the concept of operations focus and shape the intelligence effort; intelligence that is not relevant to the mission is useless. IRs and intelligence operations are continually evaluated to ensure that they are focused on supporting mission accomplishment.

## 1006. Principles of Intelligence Operations

Intelligence operations are conducted in accordance with the following principles:

- **The focus is on tactical intelligence.** The Marine Corps is primarily a tactical organization, and the focus of Marine intelligence operations is on the generation of tactical intelligence.
- **Intelligence is focused downward.** Intelligence must be available to commanders at all levels. Although the management of intelligence collection and production is centralized in the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) command element (CE), the focus is on providing the intelligence needed to plan and execute the mission to every unit involved in the operation. The requirements of the entire force will be considered in directing the intelligence effort. Critical products will be *pushed* down to the tactical commander, who will

<sup>2</sup> The term PIR replaces the term essential element of information. For a discussion of IRs, PIRs, and CCIRs, see Paragraph 3003.

be able to *pull* additional intelligence support as needed.

- **Intelligence drives operations.** The Marine Corps' warfighting philosophy depends on timely, accurate intelligence for success. Intelligence is the critical underpinning for each phase of the PDE&A cycle.
- **Intelligence activities require centralized management.** Good intelligence is the result of the integration of many separate and specialized collection, processing, and analytical resources. The scarcity of these assets, coupled with the requirement to focus on the commander's PIRs, creates the need for centralized coordination and management. This centralization will be done in the MAGTF CE, under the direction of intelligence officers who are trained and experienced in the management of multidiscipline, all-source<sup>3</sup> intelligence operations. *Although centralized coordination and management is required for efficient and effective use of intelligence assets, it is critical for the commander who is exercising centralized control to allocate appropriate resources to ensure that needs of subordinate commands that are crucial to mission accomplishment are properly addressed.*
- **The G-2/S-2 facilitates use of intelligence.** The intelligence officer enables effective use of intelligence throughout the command. As the principal disseminator of intelligence, the intelligence officer ensures that the full implications of the intelligence picture are understood. To do this, the intelligence officer must be a *full and continuous* participant in the planning process.
- **Intelligence must be tailored and timely.** Intelligence must be tailored to the requirements of the user, provided in a useful format, and received in time to affect the decisionmaking process. Delivery of the right intelligence—not simply data or information—to the right place at the right time must be the guiding principle of all dissemination efforts.

- **Utilization is the final step of the intelligence cycle.** Intelligence has no inherent value; its value is derived from its support of decisionmaking. The intelligence cycle is not complete until the intelligence that has been developed is used to plan and/or execute operations.

## 1007. Intelligence Functions

In providing support to the commander, Marine intelligence organizations carry out six specific intelligence functions:

- **Support the commander's estimate.** Intelligence supports the formulation and subsequent modification of the commander's estimate of the situation by providing as accurate an image of the battlespace and the threat as possible. In this manner, intelligence supports initial planning and decisionmaking. One of the principal tools used in this function is intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. IPB helps to provide an appreciation for the characteristics of the area of operations and the enemy capabilities, weaknesses, and COAs. This knowledge affords the commander an understanding of the battlespace and the opportunity to exploit enemy vulnerabilities.
- **Develop the situation.** Situation development provides continuing knowledge of unfolding events to help update the image of the situation. It is a dynamic process that is used to assess the current situation and confirm or deny the adoption of specific COAs by the enemy. It helps refine our understanding of the battlespace and reduces uncertainty and risk. Situation development occurs during execution and provides the basis for adapting plans or exploiting opportunities.
- **Provide indications and warning (I&W).** I&W serve a protective purpose, providing early warning of potential hostile action. They help prevent surprise and reduce risk from enemy actions that run counter to planning assumptions.

<sup>3</sup> All-source intelligence is intelligence that incorporates all available sources of information in the development of the finished intelligence product.

| Intelligence Functions          | Commander's Focus                         | Operational Activities  |
|---------------------------------|---|---|
| Support to commander's estimate | Plan a mission                            | Develop and analyze COAs  |
| Situation development           | Execute the mission                       | Monitor execution<br>Modify plan as necessary                                 |
| Indications and warning         | Orient on contingencies                   | Increase readiness<br>Develop contingency plans                               |
| Support to force protection     | Force Protection                          | Support operational security (OPSEC)<br>NBC defense<br>Support deception plan |
| Support to targeting            | Plan fire support                         | Attack targets  |
| Support to combat assessment    | Reorient forces<br>Plan future operations | Consolidate, pursue, exploit<br>Reattack targets                              |

**Figure 1-3. Relationship Between Intelligence Functions and Operations.**

- **Support force protection.** Force protection is the set of comprehensive security measures, collection activities, and operations that are undertaken to guard the force against the effects of enemy action. Intelligence supports force protection by identifying, locating, and countering an enemy's intelligence collection, sabotage, subversion, and terrorism capabilities. Support to force protection requires detailed and accurate assessments of threat force capabilities and intentions and facilitates efforts to deny the enemy the opportunity to take offensive action against our forces.
- **Support targeting.** Intelligence supports targeting by identifying target systems, critical nodes, and high-value and high-payoff targets as well as by providing the intelligence required to most effectively engage these targets.
- **Support combat assessment.** Combat assessment is the process used to determine the overall

effectiveness of military operations and identify requirements for future actions. Intelligence supports the entire combat assessment process and is directly responsible for battle damage assessment (BDA), which is one of the principal components of combat assessment. BDA is the timely and accurate estimate of the damage resulting from the application of military force. BDA estimates physical damage to a particular target, functional damage to that target, and the capability of the entire target system to continue its operations.

All six functions are carried out continually during the PDE&A cycle at all levels throughout the force. However, particular functions may be stressed more during one phase of the cycle, and different units may emphasize one or two functions over the others on the basis of their individual missions. Figure 1-3 illustrates the relationship between the intelligence functions, the commander's decisionmaking, and operational activities.

## 1008. The Role of the Commander in Intelligence

*Intelligence is an inherent and essential responsibility of command.* Commanders must come to think of command and intelligence as inseparable, just as they commonly think of command and operations as inseparable. They must study and understand both the theory and the practice of intelligence doctrine. They must be personally involved in the conduct of intelligence activities, providing guidance, supervision, judgment, and authority to ensure a timely and useful product. The commander's involvement in the intelligence process encompasses the following specific responsibilities:

- **Focus the intelligence effort.** The commander must provide the guidance and direction necessary for the effective conduct of intelligence activities. Intelligence assets will rarely be sufficient to satisfy every requirement. Thus, the intelligence effort must be focused on clearly articulated priorities that drive the concept of intelligence support and the collection, production, and dissemination efforts. The commander provides this focus through the articulation of the commander's intent, the planning guidance, and the command's PIRs.
- **Participate in the intelligence process.** Although the intelligence officer manages the intelligence effort for the commander, the commander is responsible for the results of this effort. Effective participation in the intelligence process requires an understanding of the practical capabilities and limitations of intelligence personnel, equipment, procedures, and products. The commander should supervise the process, interjecting guidance and direction at key points to ensure that the process is responding to the commander's intent. For example, the commander should define the scope of the IPB effort, identify the preferred intelligence product format, and establish priorities among subordinate commands' IRs.
- **Use intelligence in decisionmaking.** Intelligence exists for the primary purpose of aiding the commander's decisionmaking process. Although the

intelligence officer facilitates the use of intelligence throughout the command by providing timely dissemination of the intelligence product and ensuring that the meaning of the intelligence is understood, the commander makes the judgment of its operational impact. The commander makes a personal analysis of the intelligence product and arrives at the estimate of the situation that serves as the basis for the decision. This act is the responsibility of the commander and no one else.

- **Support the intelligence effort.** Intelligence is a team effort. Good intelligence is the result of the integration of many separate and specialized collection, processing, and analytical resources. Some of these resources are organic to the unit; many are provided by units or agencies outside the command. Intelligence operations by organic assets normally cannot succeed without support from throughout the command. Reconnaissance teams must be inserted, sensors implanted, communications assets provided for the dissemination of intelligence, and so on. Timely and effective intelligence dissemination requires the dedication of significant C2 assets. Once an operation begins, nearly every Marine will have the occasion to observe significant facts about the enemy and environment; all personnel should understand and carry out their responsibility to collect and report information. The commander must ensure that all members of the unit understand the importance placed on intelligence and the requirement to support the intelligence effort. In addition, external support must be requested and coordinated. The intelligence section executes the procedures necessary to obtain the required support, but does so in the name of the commander. When the command's support requirements go unsatisfied, the commander must intervene, lending command authority to obtain the necessary support.
- **Evaluate the results of intelligence activities.** The commander must provide feedback to the intelligence support system. This feedback should identify where the intelligence provided met expectations and where and how it fell short. Key areas to evaluate include product content, presentation, timeliness, and overall usefulness.

Meaningful evaluation of the intelligence effort provides the basis for its continual improvement.



## Chapter 2

# Intelligence and Command and Control

*“War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for: a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth.”*

— Clausewitz

### 2001. Overview


C2 aims to reduce the amount of uncertainty that commanders must accept—to a reasonable point—so that they can make sound decisions. Intelligence is a principal component of C2. It is a process conducted specifically to aid the commander in decisionmaking by reducing this uncertainty. Intelligence operations support the commander’s PDE&A cycle by helping to build situational awareness and providing insight into the nature of the problem with which the commander is faced. Intelligence provides knowledge concerning the environment and the enemy while furnishing an estimate of potential enemy activities. This knowledge is used by the commander to devise workable, flexible plans; make sound and timely decisions; monitor events to ensure proper execution; and modify decisions quickly in response to changing situations or to exploit fleeting opportunities.

### 2002. Intelligence and Decisionmaking

A principal aim of C2 is to enhance the commander’s ability to make sound and timely decisions. Decisionmaking is a time-competitive process that depends in part on the availability of the right elements of information at the right time and place. Without the information that provides the basis of situational awareness, no commander can make sound decisions. Intelligence operations are focused on providing the right elements of information concerning the threat and the environment, that is, intelligence, required to generate situational awareness and fuel the decisionmaking process.

#### a. A Model for C2

A simple model that is known as the observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) loop is used to describe the C2 process. (See figure 2-1.)



**Figure 2-1. The OODA Loop.**

The OODA loop applies to any two-sided conflict, whether the combatants are individuals or large military formations. When engaged in conflict, the participants:

- **Observe.** Take in information about the environment, the friendly status, and the threat.

- **Orient.** Make estimates, assumptions, analyses, and judgments about the situation to create a cohesive mental image.
- **Decide.** Determine what needs to be done, whether it is an immediate reaction or a deliberate plan.
- **Act.** Put the decision into action.

The OODA loop reflects how C2 is a continual, cyclical process. In any conflict, the participant who can consistently and effectively cycle through the OODA loop faster—who can maintain a higher tempo of actions—gains an increasing advantage with each cycle. The essential lesson of the OODA loop is the importance of generating and maintaining tempo in C2.

## b. Intelligence and the OODA Loop

Intelligence operations facilitate the exercise of C2 by helping to reduce the uncertainty confronting the commander, providing a significant part of the knowledge needed to reach the decision, and assisting in monitoring the implementation and effects of that decision. Intelligence supports all phases of the OODA loop.

**(1) Observe.** Intelligence collection operations observe threat activity and current environmental conditions. All-source analysis of the collected intelligence information is provided to enhance the commander's situational awareness and understanding of the battlespace.

**(2) Orient.** The image of the battlespace presented by intelligence, coupled with the predictive analysis of the IPB process, helps to orient the commander. It aids in comparing the current situation to the desired end state and in identifying COAs to achieve that end state.

**(3) Decide.** Intelligence enables decisionmaking by helping to define what is operationally possible and most advantageous. It provides the framework for assessing the potential COAs against existing environmental conditions and threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, and likely responses.

**(4) Act.** Intelligence supports execution by providing a shared picture of the battlespace to all levels of command and by meeting the intelligence needs of all levels of commanders involved in the conduct of operations. Once the concept of operations has been formulated, the focus of intelligence activities shifts from developing the wide-scope intelligence required for COA selection to providing detailed, tailored intelligence to support mission planning and execution.

Intelligence is also critical to generating and maintaining tempo in C2. During execution, supporting intelligence operations are conducted to monitor enemy reactions, protect the force from enemy counteraction, and assess the effects of ongoing operations. The continuing intelligence development effort aids the commander in effectively cycling through the OODA loop faster to gain an increasing advantage over the enemy.

## c. Decisionmaking Approaches

There are two basic approaches to decisionmaking: analytical and intuitive. In analytical decisionmaking, several options for solving the problem at hand are identified, studied, and compared to arrive at the best solution. In intuitive decisionmaking, the commander assesses the situation in an effort to recognize a pattern; once a pattern is identified, experience and judgment guide the commander in evaluating the key elements of the problem and rapidly determining a satisfactory solution. Each approach has different strengths and weaknesses; although conceptually distinct, the two are rarely mutually exclusive in practice. Intelligence supports both approaches. Intelligence supports analytical decisionmaking by helping to identify the options available and provide the framework (in the form of estimates and studies focused on the threat and key factors of the battlespace) for analysis and comparison of those options. Intelligence supports intuitive decisionmaking by providing the knowledge that helps the commander to recognize emerging patterns. The same methodology is used to develop intelligence support for both decisionmaking approaches. The application of that methodology will vary based on the specifics of each situation and the decisionmaking style of the supported commander, but the goal remains the same: to provide

a knowledge-based intelligence product that can be applied to make a sound decision.

### 2003. Intelligence and the PDE&A Cycle

The PDE&A cycle provides a framework for the implementation of C2. It translates the cognitive process of the OODA loop into a concrete series of actions taken by the commander and the staff to plan and execute an operation. To be effective, intelligence operations must be linked to the commander's decisionmaking process and the resulting operational activity. Therefore, intelligence operations are integrated with the PDE&A cycle. Specific intelligence tasks are carried out to support each phase of this cycle. While the level of command, time available, and specific tactical situation will influence how the PDE&A cycle is carried out and the degree of detail applied in performing intelligence activities, the same basic intelligence development process is employed in both deliberate and rapid planning scenarios and supports both analytical and intuitive decisionmaking. Intelligence support to planning begins with the provision of a basic description of the environmental conditions and enemy situation in the projected area of operations. As plans are developed and refined, the intelligence effort becomes more narrowly focused on the identification of the enemy's critical vulnerabilities and potential COAs as well as on the generation of mission-specific intelligence products that support detailed planning and execution of specific operational activities. Finally, during mission execution, intelligence operations concentrate on the satisfaction of requirements linked to key operational decisions and the recognition of exploitable opportunities as they arise in the battlespace.

### 2004. Intelligence Support to Planning

Planning is the process of developing practical schemes for taking future actions. It represents an effort to project operational concepts and designs forward in time and space. During the planning process, the commander assesses the situation, builds a vision of the battlespace, and develops the desired outcome of the battle or campaign. By definition, planning is oriented


on the future. Because the primary objective of intelligence is to reduce uncertainty about the future, intelligence makes a critical contribution to this process. Much of the intelligence effort is "front-loaded" to support planning; a substantial portion of intelligence development must be completed during this phase. Intelligence provides a comprehensive image of the battlespace and the threat and helps commanders to make provision for constant or predictable aspects of the environment, to come to an understanding on the general direction of future actions, and to anticipate possible threat force actions and reactions.

#### a. Planning Models

A variety of planning models are currently being used in the Marine Corps. The choice of planning model is made on the basis of a variety of factors, including the mission, level of command, command relationships, time available, and preferences of individual commanders. All planning models have the same basic elements in common—they:

- Determine what needs to be done
- Identify one or more COAs to accomplish the required tasks
- Study the COA(s) to test feasibility, identify support requirements, and select the most promising alternative
- Convey instructions to subordinates to execute the plan.

*Intelligence development follows the same basic process, no matter which planning model is used. While the specific steps and sequence used in planning may vary, the requirement to provide focused, continuous intelligence to shape the planning process remains constant. A generic planning model will be used to outline the baseline methodology for the provision of intelligence support to planning. The components of this generic model are: mission analysis, COA*



development, COA analysis, and plan/orders development.<sup>1</sup> (See figure 2-2 on next page.)

## b. Mission Analysis

Mission analysis is conducted to identify the tasks required to accomplish the mission, develop baseline knowledge of the situation, and determine what additional information is required to facilitate the planning process. Intelligence supports mission analysis through the provision of basic intelligence on the nature of the area of operations and the threat. Intelligence operations are guided by the results of mission analysis—formulation of initial commander's intent, planning guidance, and PIRs.

**(1) Mission Receipt.** The receipt of the mission starts the formal planning cycle. However, preliminary planning is normally conducted before the receipt of a

mission to anticipate future taskings and potential actions required to accomplish those taskings. Intelligence, in performing its I&W function, will monitor a command's area of interest and identify developing crisis situations and/or potential missions. The commander uses this information to anticipate future missions and to direct the staff to accomplish preliminary planning and information/intelligence development before the arrival of formal mission tasking. Much of this preliminary work is carried out by the intelligence section, including the collection of basic data on the threat and the environment, IPB analysis, and the dissemination of intelligence throughout the staff.

## (2) Information Requirements and Exchange.

The process of identifying IRs as well as gathering and distributing information within the staff and throughout the command begins during preliminary planning and

<sup>1</sup> For a more complete discussion of planning and the planning process, see MCDP 5, *Planning* (July 1997), and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning*. (MCWP 5-1 is scheduled for publication by the end of fiscal year 1998.)

intensifies once the mission is received. Intelligence is provided about threat forces and the area of operations, with a focus on the advantages and limitations presented by the environment and the strengths and critical vulnerabilities of the threat. This intelligence is disseminated through a variety of media: the distribution of basic products (e.g., maps, imagery, and threat forces studies), the conduct of orientation briefings, and the provision of IPB analysis. During this step, the continuous, interactive process of IR development also begins. Products provided by the intelligence section stimulate additional questions from the commander and members of the staff, and these questions are translated into new or refined IRs. The new requirements are then used to focus the intelligence development process.

**(3) Mission Analysis.** The commander makes a critical contribution to the operation during this step, setting the stage for the completion of planning and mission execution. During mission analysis, the commander and the staff draw together all available intelligence and information, focus it on the assigned mission, develop an understanding of the tasks to be accomplished, and formulate a rough concept of how to best accomplish those tasks. The result is an initial statement of commander's intent and commander's planning guidance that focuses the remainder of the planning process.

*The intelligence officer is a full participant in mission analysis.* During mission analysis, the intelligence officer:

- Orients the commander and the other members of the staff to the battlespace and the nature of the threat
- Aids in the formulation of the commander's intent by helping to define what is both operationally possible and most advantageous (This is accomplished primarily through the provision of the results of IPB and the analytical process; these results identify the threat's center of gravity, strengths, and critical vulnerabilities and indicate the potential advantages and limitations imposed by the environment.)

- Receives guidance from the commander to help shape the intelligence effort. This guidance can take a variety of forms: a statement of commander's intent, a list of PIRs, or direct instructions from the commander about intelligence needs or concerns.

### c. COA Development

Building on the knowledge gained through mission analysis, the commander and staff next develop a concept for carrying out the required tasks that embodies the commander's intent and planning guidance. This concept, or COA, encompasses general schemes for the execution of maneuver, fires, logistics, and other supporting functions that are necessary for the successful implementation of the basic concept.

When time permits, the staff usually develops several COAs on the basis of the commander's intent and planning guidance. Intelligence supports this process by:

- Continuously updating the view of the battlespace
- Defining operational possibilities through the IPB process
- Providing the focus on the enemy through identification of the threat's centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, and potential COAs, with an emphasis on the most likely and most dangerous of these COAs
- Ensuring that the commander and staff receive, understand, and use relevant, focused, knowledge-based intelligence that enhances their understanding of the situation, rather than a stream of unfocused information.

In addition, the intelligence officer interacts with the staff throughout the COA development process, integrating continuing intelligence development efforts with the potential COAs in an effort to ensure that intelligence will be available to support any COA selected.

When an intuitive approach is used, intelligence helps the commander recognize emerging patterns, identify a

workable solution, and rapidly evaluate that solution. Products developed through the IPB process present intelligence in the form of images that permit decision-makers to quickly visualize the situation, see patterns, and assess potential alternatives.

#### d. COA Analysis

After they are developed, the COAs are analyzed and compared in an effort to identify the best COA and the concept of operations needed to implement that COA. When time permits, the staff conducts a detailed analysis of each COA, and each principal staff officer prepares a formal estimate of supportability. Whenever possible, the COAs should be wargamed to predict the action, reaction, and counterreaction dynamics of each COA.

Intelligence assists COA analysis by:

- Identifying and refining threat COAs and actions/reactions to friendly COAs that are under consideration
- Playing the role of the enemy in the wargaming process
- Developing an independent evaluation of each friendly COA based on an understanding of the environment and the potential threat response as well as on the ability to provide intelligence support to that COA
- Helping to focus the staff on the factors of the environment and the enemy, with an emphasis on the degree of uncertainty and resulting risk associated with each COA.

The intelligence officer's full participation is crucial to successful COA analysis. It is during this step that the full implications of the intelligence estimate are absorbed and applied. To maximize this contribution, the intelligence officer must be able to both "think red"—analyze the situation from the enemy's perspective—and "think blue"—understand the intent and construct of friendly plans and operations. Combining these two perspectives enables the intelligence officer to assess the potential effects of threat force actions on the potential COAs.

When time is not available to wargame and conduct a complete COA analysis, the commander makes a rapid mental assessment of the available options. The situational awareness that is provided in large part through intelligence guides the commander in evaluating these options and quickly selecting one that offers potential for success.

#### e. Plan/Orders Development

On the basis of the COA analysis, the commander selects a COA, refines the intent, and gives further guidance on the development of the detailed concept of operations and supporting plans or orders. The emphasis of the intelligence effort, which is focused on the commander's intent, the selected COA, and the identified PIRs, shifts from the development of basic and broad-scope intelligence in support of *conceptual planning* to the provision of specific intelligence that facilitates *functional planning*, *detailed planning*, and *mission execution*. The intelligence tasks of I&W and supporting the commander's estimate continue, but situation development, support to targeting, and support to force protection now receive increased emphasis.

A concept of intelligence support is prepared to allocate intelligence resources in accordance with the main effort and the concept of operations. The results of COA analysis and wargaming are used to develop and implement collection, production, and dissemination plans to support the chosen COA. IPB efforts are intensified in an effort to satisfy PIRs and develop the in-depth intelligence required for the detailed planning of specific operational activities. Intelligence sections prepare and disseminate products that embody the results of the IPB process and intelligence collection activities to provide a shared view of the battlespace at all levels of the force. At the same time, they deliver *mission-specific intelligence* in response to the extensive and precise functional and detailed planning requirements of units that will execute the operation. CI plans and measures are prepared and implemented to conceal our intentions and protect the force. The results of these intelligence activities are used to shape and develop the overall plan/order and the plan's comprehensive supporting

| Marine Corps Planning Process   | Associated Intelligence Activities and Operations  |
|---|--|
| <b>Mission analysis:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mission receipt (including premission activities)</li> <li>• Information requirements and exchange</li> <li>• Mission analysis</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitor area of interest</li> <li>• Assemble databases</li> <li>• Initiate IPB</li> <li>• Disseminate basic intelligence products</li> <li>• Receive/develop, prioritize, and process IRs</li> <li>• Deliver orientation brief</li> <li>• Provide results of initial IPB</li> <li>• Develop PIRs</li> </ul> |
| COA development   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Update and refine IPB, PIRs/IRs</li> <li>• Identify enemy centers of gravity, vulnerabilities, and COAs</li> <li>• Implement/update collection, production, and dissemination plans</li> </ul>  |
| COA analysis  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refine enemy COAs</li> <li>• Evaluate friendly COAs</li> <li>• Update intelligence estimate and IPB products</li> <li>• Prepare intelligence estimate of supportability</li> </ul>  |
| COA comparison/decision   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Update intelligence products and estimates</li> <li>• Support and participate in wargaming</li> <li>• Develop intelligence units task organization</li> </ul>   |
| Plans/orders development  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refine and execute collection, production, and dissemination plan</li> <li>• Prepare and disseminate finished, mission-specific intelligence products</li> <li>• Implement CI plans and measures</li> </ul>   |
| Transition  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Update intelligence products and estimates</li> <li>• Provide/update mission taskings to intelligence units</li> </ul>  |

**Figure 2-3. Intelligence Activities During Planning.**

annexes and appendices. Figure 2-3 summarizes intelligence activities during planning.

## 2005. Intelligence Support to Execution

During execution, the plan is refined, implemented, and adapted in response to changes in the situation and action/reaction of the enemy. C2 is a process that generates swift, appropriate, and decisive action and provides a means of continuously assessing developments that provide the basis for adapting. The commander uses a variety of techniques and measures to supervise, monitor, and modify the execution of the plan, thereby shaping the battle and maintaining unity of effort. The intelligence effort must be responsive to the needs of mission execution and ensure a continuous flow of intelligence throughout the force to maintain a shared

picture of the battlespace and satisfy new requirements developed by the operating forces. Intelligence operations are integrated with the concept of operations to enhance force protection, develop situational awareness, and support combat assessment. The results of these operations are used to modify the plan or exercise tactical options, thereby enabling rapid decisionmaking as well as generating and maintaining tempo. In addition, the information developed through these activities is entered into the continuous intelligence development process, which provides the basis for planning future operations.

### a. The Environment of Execution

Intelligence support to execution differs in significant ways from intelligence support to planning. First, while intelligence support to planning requires the development of a large volume of basic intelligence and the preparation of broad-scope estimates needed to

develop and analyze COAs, intelligence support to execution involves the satisfaction of a much larger body of IRs in a significantly greater degree of detail. For example, during COA development, it may be sufficient to tell a MAGTF or ground combat element (GCE) commander that an enemy mechanized force is located in a general area and has an approximate number of tanks and armored personnel carriers of various types. However, the subordinate unit tasked with establishing a blocking position opposite that enemy force will require specific locations, numbers, and types of enemy vehicles to carry out its mission effectively. In another example, the nature of the intelligence required by a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) commander to make a decision as to whether a raid or tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP) mission is feasible is fundamentally different from the type and detail of intelligence required by the raid or TRAP force commander who will execute that mission.

A second major difference between intelligence support to planning and intelligence support to execution is the time available for the development of the intelligence product. Often days, weeks, and sometimes months are available to provide intelligence support to planning, but intelligence support to execution must normally be developed in hours, minutes, or even seconds. Success in execution often depends on the ability to provide immediate answers to critical questions concerning threat force dispositions, actions, and intentions.

Finally, the uncertainty and disorder that are inherent in the nature of war manifest themselves primarily during execution. Once execution begins, interaction between the opposing wills of friendly and enemy forces normally causes significant and fundamental changes in the situation. Discerning environmental conditions as well as enemy capabilities and intentions becomes increasingly difficult once these forces are set in motion, yet it is at precisely this time that commanders require detailed and accurate intelligence to help cope with the uncertainty.

The combined factors of the extensive nature of the IRs, the degree of detail required, the limited time available, and the uncertainty inherent during execution make the provision of intelligence support to execution

the most significant intelligence challenge. Intelligence operations must be prepared to meet this challenge and to provide the flexibility and agility required to deliver continuous situational awareness, identify opportunities, and facilitate rapid decisionmaking during mission execution.

## **b. Intelligence During Execution**

Intelligence support during execution focuses on providing the commander with practical knowledge that gives an exploitable advantage over the enemy. Although eliminating uncertainty during execution is impossible, focused intelligence operations can reduce uncertainty by providing situational awareness and identifying opportunities as they present themselves in the battlespace. In addition, intelligence provides I&W of new or unexpected enemy activities, enhances efforts to engage the enemy through support to targeting, assists in protecting the force through CI measures and operations, and supports the planning of future operations by the provision of timely and accurate BDA. Three key factors for ensuring effective intelligence support during execution are resource allocation, linkage to operations, and generation of tempo.

**(1) Resource Allocation.** The allocation of intelligence resources is most critical during mission execution. As IRs will always exceed available intelligence resources, intelligence operations must be focused where they can have the greatest effect. A detailed and well-thought-out concept of intelligence support, developed in accordance with the commander's intent and concept of operations, will provide an appropriate allocation of intelligence capabilities between the main effort and supporting efforts and between intelligence support to the execution of current operations and the continuous planning effort for future operations. It is particularly important that Marine Corps force (MARFOR), MAGTF, and major subordinate commanders who control the tasking of intelligence units and capabilities provide access to critical intelligence resources for their subordinate elements. Those intelligence resources best suited to satisfying current, tactical, mission-specific IRs, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or terrain analysts, should be allocated to units that are responsible for executing the mission.



**(2) Linkage to Operations.** To provide effective support to execution, intelligence operations must be linked to planned and ongoing operational activity. Intelligence operations are conducted based on the results of the IPB process, wargaming, and the planning process. Collection, production, and dissemination plans are developed to support the execution of specific tactical options, the engagement of targets, and the selection of branches and sequels to the operations plan. Intelligence personnel must have continuous awareness of planned and ongoing operations to monitor potential enemy reactions, identify new opportunities, and assess the effects of our actions on the enemy. Close and continuous synchronization of intelligence activities and operations is essential to developing timely, tailored, and relevant intelligence that facilitates rapid decisionmaking and the exploitation of opportunities in the battlespace.

**(3) Generation of Tempo.** Intelligence operations during execution must facilitate the generation of tempo. First, intelligence operations generate tempo through prioritization. By focusing intelligence operations on satisfying PIRs and supporting the main effort, intelligence is developed that is directly linked to the commander's intent and C2 effort. Next, intelligence facilitates tempo by supporting the decisionmaking process. Intelligence that provides situational awareness and the ability to recognize emerging patterns enables the commander to employ intuitive decision-making to make rapid decisions that help to generate tempo. Finally, intelligence facilitates tempo by providing knowledge—key elements of data and information that have been analyzed, synthesized, and placed in context to help provide situational awareness—not just a mass of unprocessed information or unrelated pieces of data. The critical factor is not the amount of information provided, but rather the provision of key, focused intelligence that is available when needed and in a useful form that improves the commander's knowledge of the hostile situation and the commander's ability to act. Intelligence operations must have the flexibility, agility, and responsiveness to rapidly collect and process relevant information, develop a focused product, and deliver that product to the affected commander in an easily understandable form and in time for the commander to take appropriate action.

## Chapter 3

# Developing Intelligence

*“It is not that one general is more brilliant or experienced than the other; it is a question of which general has a better appreciation of the battlefield.”*

— Field Marshall Erwin Rommel


### 3001. Overview

Intelligence is developed through the use of a systematic process. This process consists of a sequence of related activities that translate requirements for various types of information into intelligence that is furnished to the commander for use in the decisionmaking cycle. During this sequence, intelligence needs are identified; a *plan* is formulated and *directions* are given for satisfying those needs, data is *collected*, *processed*, and *exploited* for usable information that is then transformed into a tailored, useful intelligence *product* that is *disseminated* to and *utilized* by the appropriate commander or unit. This process is called the intelligence cycle. At the same time, a parallel process is used to develop CI plans and measures that deny information to an adversary to protect our forces and help ensure the effectiveness of our operations.

### 3002. The Intelligence Cycle

The intelligence cycle consists of six steps: *planning and direction*, *collection*, *processing and exploitation*, *production*, *dissemination*, and *utilization*. (See figure 3-1.) These steps define a sequential and interdependent process for the development of intelligence. Intelligence operations are conducted within the framework of the intelligence cycle; the entire cycle or a specific step within the cycle may be the focus of a particular intelligence activity. Moreover, *all* intelligence, regardless of the scope of the requirement or level of command, is

developed by following these steps. (See figures 3-2 and 3-3 on the next page.)



**Figure 3-1. The Intelligence Cycle.**

No one phase of the cycle is more important than the others—all of the phases are interdependent. Without proper direction, the other phases will be diffused or not focused on the correct objectives. Without effective collection, there may be too much or too little information and what information there is may prove to be irrelevant. Without processing and production, there is a mass of random data instead of the knowledge needed for the planning and execution of operations. Intelligence is meaningless unless it reaches the right people in time to affect the decisionmaking process and in a

### The Intelligence Cycle—Macro View

During a routine review of the situation in the Marine expeditionary force's (MEF's) area of interest, the G-2 notes that a recent change in government in one of the countries has created the potential for instability over the next year. The G-2 directs the development of an intelligence estimate to support potential contingency operations in this country. Working with the MARFOR G-2 section and the pertinent combatant command's joint intelligence center (JIC), the collections section submits requests for imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and HUMINT support. As information is received, the MEF G-2 section's all-source fusion center (AFC), with the assistance of the topographic platoon, the force imagery interpretation unit (FIIU), and the radio battalion, processes and exploits the information to produce the estimate and supporting studies. The estimate is completed within a month. The G-2 directs that copies be forwarded to all major subordinate commands (MSCs) and staff sections, with priority to the forward-deployed MEU. The G-2 also recommends to the commanding general that the scenario for the MEF's upcoming command post (CP) exercise be based on this estimate to introduce MEF personnel to this contingency area, identify planning requirements, and develop potential COAs. The MEF G-2 has *directed* the development of a comprehensive intelligence product that is focused on an operational requirement. Extensive organic capabilities as well as external resources were integrated to *collect* data, *process* it into information, and *produce* the finished intelligence. The product was then *disseminated* to and *utilized* by the units and staff sections with contingency responsibility for the identified area.


**Figure 3-2. The Intelligence Cycle—Macro View.**

### The Intelligence Cycle—Micro View

The regimental S-2 section receives a report from one of their reconnaissance teams that an enemy artillery battery has just passed their observation post (OP) and turned off the road. Knowing that enemy artillery is the top targeting priority, the intelligence watch immediately begins developing the target. The S-2 chief checks the map and notes that there are three potential firing positions (identified through the IPB process) close to, but out of visual range of, the reconnaissance OP. The S-2 chief also knows that UAVs are in direct support of the regiment at this time. The S-2 chief alerts the fire support coordination center (FSCC) concerning the potential target and works with the FSCC and air officer to divert an ongoing UAV mission to search the potential firing positions. The UAV quickly locates the enemy artillery in the second firing position. The S-2 chief confirms that the enemy weapons can range friendly positions and, based on their observed activity, are preparing to attack. Using this intelligence, the FSCC coordinates a counterfire mission against the enemy artillery. The S-2 chief successfully executed the intelligence cycle in a matter of minutes: He understood the requirement to develop targeting information, directed the *collection* of information, *processed* the information and *produced* the desired intelligence, that is, a target, and *disseminated* that target to the FSCC, who *utilized* that intelligence to

form that is understandable. Finally, the whole process is wasted effort unless the knowledge and understanding that the intelligence gives us are used to influence the conduct of operations.

An understanding of the process used to develop intelligence is critical to the execution of successful intelligence operations. All personnel involved in the *development* and *use* of intelligence must be aware of their role in the process. They must understand the relationship between the steps in the process to ensure that



**Figure 3-4. Intelligence Development and the Intelligence Cycle.**

the intelligence formulated focuses on the mission and facilitates rapid decisionmaking in the execution of successful combat operations. (See figure 3-4.)

### 3003. Intelligence Requirements

IRs *drive* the intelligence cycle. Properly articulated, mission-oriented requirements focus the intelligence effort and provide the foundation for successful intelligence operations.

#### a. Definition

An IR is a missing piece of information about the enemy or environment that a commander needs to know to make a sound decision. In its simplest form, an IR is a question about the threat or the battlespace, the answer to which is required for the planning and execution of an operation. Examples are:

- Will the highway bridge support assault amphibious vehicles?
- Will the weather conditions interfere with planned air operations?

- Are port facilities and conditions suitable for a maritime prepositioning force pierside offload?
- Can the enemy air defense system threaten low-flying helicopters?
- What is the reaction time of the enemy garrison located south of the amphibious objective area?

## b. Categories of IRs

Requirements fall into two categories: IRs and PIRs.<sup>1</sup>

### Priority Intelligence Requirement

A PIR is “an intelligence requirement associated with a decision that will critically affect the overall success of the command’s mission.” (MCDP 2)

IRs cover the entire spectrum of information that is needed concerning the battlespace and the threat. The scarce intelligence assets and limited time available will rarely permit the satisfaction of all of a command’s IRs; thus, it is important to focus the intelligence effort on those requirements that are critical to mission success. These critical IRs are designated as PIRs. PIRs are the subset of the CCIRs that focus on the threat and the environment.<sup>2</sup> PIRs are linked to specific decisions and, in effect, constitute the commander’s guidance for intelligence. Notional PIRs are listed below:

- What size force is defending amphibious task force objective B?
- Which bridges over the Sand River are intact?
- Will the enemy use chemical weapons against the beach support area on D-day?

There is no standard list or set rule for determining PIRs. Each tactical situation poses distinct problems and specific gaps in intelligence; however, the commander will often have PIRs that concern the most

likely enemy COA, the most dangerous enemy COA, and critical enemy vulnerabilities that can be exploited.

## c. Characteristics

PIRs and IRs have the following characteristics. Each PIR or IR:

- Asks only one question
- Focuses on specific facts, events, or activities concerning the enemy or the battlespace
- Is tied to mission planning, decisionmaking, and execution
- Provides a clear, concise statement of what intelligence is required
- Contains geographic and time elements to limit the scope of the requirement.


Requirements may be simple or complex, and it is important to understand that the nature and scope of PIRs and IRs will vary with the mission and the level of command. They will also differ depending on the particular phase in the PDE&A cycle; requirements will generally become more focused as you move through the cycle. During execution, the intelligence effort should be directed against a small number of PIRs that are closely linked to the concept of operations.

## 3004. Planning and Direction

The planning and direction phase of the intelligence cycle consists of those activities that identify pertinent IRs and provide the means for satisfying those requirements. (See figure 3-5.) Intelligence planning and direction is a continuous function and a command responsibility. The commander directs the intelligence effort; the intelligence officer manages this effort for the commander based on the intent, designation of PIRs, and specific guidance provided during the planning process.

<sup>1</sup> PIRs and IRs replace the terms essential elements of information (EEI) and other intelligence requirements (OIRs) found in previous Marine Corps intelligence doctrine.

<sup>2</sup> CCIRs are intelligence and information requirements the satisfaction of which the commander deems critical to decisionmaking and mission success.



**Figure 3-5. Functions of the Planning and Direction Phase.**

### **a. Requirements Development**

**(1) Identification of Requirements.** Concise, mission-oriented IRs provide clear direction to the intelligence effort. The entire staff and all subordinate commanders play a role in developing the command's IRs. The intelligence officer formulates most of the initial requirements by using the original mission tasking together with knowledge of the threat, familiarity with the operating area, and experience derived from participation in the commander's decisionmaking process to anticipate the majority of the basic intelligence needs. As the planning process continues, the commander, other staff officers, and subordinate commands expand on previously identified requirements and develop new ones; requirements are generally linked to proposed COAs or potential decisions. The intelligence officer records, collates, and refines these requirements as they are identified and maintains a consolidated list of requirements.

**(2) Designation of PIRs.** The commander makes a critical contribution to the intelligence effort by designating the PIRs. As COAs and supporting information requirements are developed, the satisfaction of certain IRs will be essential to mission success. The identification of these "show stoppers" forms the basis for designating PIRs. The intelligence officer, with input from other members of the staff, draws up a recommended list of PIRs. The PIRs will be listed in priority order relative to their importance to mission accomplishment. In formulating this list, the G-2/S-2 considers the requirements of his own command, subordinate

commands, adjacent commands, and any direction received from higher headquarters. The recommendations are submitted to the commander who reviews, refines, and approves the *command's* PIRs. In designating PIRs, the commander establishes:

- *What* he wants to know (intelligence required)
- *Why* he wants it (linked to operational decisionmaking)
- *When* he needs it (latest time that the information will be of value)
- *How* he wants it (format, method of delivery).

Once approved and distributed, the PIRs constitute the core of the commander's guidance for the intelligence process.

### **b. Requirements Management**

The management of IRs is a dynamic process that encompasses the continuous evaluation of:


- The importance of each requirement to mission success
- The information and assets needed to satisfy each requirement
- The resources that are presently committed toward fulfilling that requirement
- The degree to which the requirement has been satisfied by completed intelligence activities.

**(1) Processing Requirements.** The development of requirements and designation of PIRs are not one-time efforts. There is a dynamic flow of new requirements, existing requirements are satisfied or no longer relevant, and the relative importance of each requirement changes as the PDE&A cycle progresses. (See figure 3-6 on next page.) As requirements are developed, the intelligence officer validates, refines, and enters them into the management system.

- Validation ensures that the requirement is relevant to the mission, has not already been satisfied, and does not duplicate other requirements.
- Refining the requirement entails placing it in the proper format, identifying all information

components related to the requirement, and adding appropriate qualifiers such as geographic limitations or time constraints. During refinement, similar or related requirements may be combined into a single, comprehensive requirement.

- A requirements management system is an essential tool that provides a means to monitor the effort to satisfy each requirement. Each intelligence section must develop a system appropriate to its mission and echelon; minimal components of any system are a numbering system, identification of who submitted the requirement, designation of collection and production resources committed to satisfying the requirement (or noting when it was submitted to higher headquarters or supporting forces, if organic assets are not available), timeliness requirements, dissemination instructions and information, and a mechanism to ensure user satisfaction.



**Figure 3-6. IR Management.**

**(2) Determining Priorities.** The intelligence officer must continually reassess the emphasis given to each requirement and realign the priorities according to commander's intent and the current phase of the PDE&A cycle. The intelligence officer must also periodically confirm the assignment of priorities with the commander to ensure that the intelligence effort is focused in accordance with the commander's desires.

**(3) Requirements Satisfaction.** Once a requirement has been identified, validated, refined, and prioritized, the intelligence officer must determine how to satisfy the requirement and, if it can be satisfied by

organic assets, allocate the appropriate intelligence assets to develop the desired intelligence. If the requirement cannot be satisfied by organic assets, it must be submitted to higher headquarters or supporting forces/agencies for satisfaction. In determining how to satisfy a requirement, the intelligence officer must consider each step in the intelligence cycle to ensure that the plan encompasses the entire process from collection through utilization. The intelligence officer must identify the information needed, where and how to get it, how to package the intelligence into an appropriate product, and how to deliver that product. Normally, an IR will generate a requirement to:

- Collect data or information
- Process and produce intelligence in the scope and form that answer the question
- Disseminate the information to a particular user by a specific time.


Thus, we can view each IR as having a unique intelligence cycle associated with it. Each requirement will generally have an associated intelligence collection requirement (ICR), intelligence production requirement (IPR), and intelligence dissemination requirement (IDR). (See figure 3-7.) However, in practice, an intelligence development effort is rarely concentrated on a single requirement. Normally, related requirements are grouped together and synchronized to ensure that intelligence operations are focused on the PIRs and satisfy as many requirements as possible. This grouping also helps with the need to employ intelligence resources in the most effective and efficient manner.

Once the ICRs, IPRs, and IDRs have been identified, the intelligence officer allocates the necessary collection, processing and exploitation, production, and dissemination assets to carry out the task. The remainder of the direction effort entails managing the intelligence effort to ensure that the limited intelligence assets stay focused on the PIRs and that the results are being delivered and used to effect operational decisions.

### c. Directing the Intelligence Effort

Intelligence direction consists of the requirements development and management process described above

combined with the associated functions of collection management, production management, and dissemination management. Because the possible questions about the enemy and the area of operations are practically infinite but intelligence assets are limited, the intelligence effort must be managed at each step in the process. Management of requirements, collection, production, and dissemination ensures that the effort is focused on the PIRs and delivers knowledge that facilitates sound tactical decisionmaking.



**Figure 3-7. Requirements Satisfaction.**

**(1) Collection Management.** Collection management is the process of converting IRs into collection requirements, establishing priorities, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results, and retasking, as required. Its purpose is to conduct an effective effort to collect all necessary data while ensuring the efficient use of limited and valuable collection assets.

**(2) Production Management.** Production management encompasses determining the scope, content, and format of each product; developing a plan and schedule for the development of each product; assigning priorities among the various IPRs; allocating processing, exploitation, and production resources; and integrating production efforts with collection and dissemination. As with collection management, the goal is to make

effective and efficient use of limited resources and ensure that the production effort is properly focused on established priorities.

**(3) Dissemination Management.** Dissemination management involves establishing dissemination priorities, selecting dissemination means, and monitoring the flow of intelligence throughout the command. The objective of dissemination management is to deliver the required intelligence to the appropriate user in the proper form at the right time while ensuring that individual consumers and the dissemination system are not overloaded by attempting to move unneeded or irrelevant information. Dissemination management also provides for use of security controls that do not impede the timely delivery or subsequent use of intelligence while protecting intelligence sources and methods.

#### **d. Planning the Intelligence Support System**

This activity includes designing and establishing the structure that is necessary to provide intelligence support throughout the course of an operation. In this planning effort, the intelligence officer looks at the entire body of IRs rather than at individual IRs or PIRs. The intelligence officer anticipates the continuing intelligence needs of the force as it carries out its mission and designs an intelligence support system that has the capability, flexibility, and redundancy to satisfy these needs. After the support system concept is developed, the resources needed to build the system are identified, requested, and acquired. Factors taken into consideration during this effort include:

- Task organization of intelligence units
- Identification of personnel and equipment requirements
- Requirement for liaison teams
- Connectivity with national, theater, joint, and multinational force intelligence assets
- Communications-information systems requirements
- Logistic requirements



- The need for specialized capabilities (e.g., linguists).

### 3005. Collection

Collection is the gathering of intelligence data and information to satisfy the identified requirements. The collection phase encompasses assembling relevant information from sources that are already on hand or available from other intelligence organizations: intelligence databases, studies, maps, and a workbook or situation map. However, we normally consider collection to consist of the activities of organic, attached, and supporting intelligence collection assets to gather new data and deliver it to the appropriate processing or production agency, that is, the execution of collection operations. Functions carried out during the execution of collection operations include:

- Mission planning
- Positioning of assets to locations that are favorable to satisfying collection objectives
- Data collection
- Reporting
- Supervision of individual collection missions.

Intelligence data and information are collected by a variety of intelligence assets, each with unique capabilities and limitations. (See figure 3-8.)

#### MAGTF Collection Assets

Radio battalion

Force reconnaissance company

UAV squadron

Sensor control and management platoon (SCAMP)

CI/HUMINT company

Light armored reconnaissance battalion

GCE reconnaissance company/platoon

### Figure 3-8. MAGTF Primary Organic Collection Assets.

The value of a collection source is not necessarily related to the sophistication or cost of that source, but rather to its ability to gather pertinent data from the collection target—the enemy or environmental consideration that is the subject of the particular ICR. Successful intelligence operations require access to data from all types of collection resources: organic, joint, national, and multinational. Collection operations are executed to gather data from all suitable and capable assets, balancing the capabilities of one type of collector against the limitations of another to provide “all-source” data input to the processing and exploitation and production phases. The primary types of intelligence data used to produce tactical intelligence are described in the following paragraphs.

#### a. IMINT

IMINT is “intelligence information derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media.” (Joint Pub 1-02) Principal sources of imagery are national overhead reconnaissance systems; manned aircraft such as the F-14 or F/A-18 with the Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System, the U-2, or the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System; and UAVs. IMINT provides concrete, detailed, and precise information on the location and physical characteristics of both the environment and the threat. It is the primary source of information concerning key terrain features, installations, and infrastructure used to build detailed intelligence studies and target materials. The main limitation of IMINT is the time required to task, collect, process, and analyze the imagery; detailed planning and coordination is required to ensure that the results of imagery collection missions are received in time to affect the decisionmaking process. In addition, imagery operations can be hampered by weather; the enemy’s air defense capability; and his camouflage, cover, and deception activities.

## **b. SIGINT**

SIGINT is intelligence information derived from the interception, processing, and analysis of foreign communications, noncommunications electronic emissions, and instrumentation signals. SIGINT is provided by the radio battalion; the Marine tactical electronic warfare squadron; and an integrated network of national, theater, and joint force SIGINT support agencies. SIGINT provides timely and accurate data on enemy forces that may include details on enemy composition, identification, and location; it can also give insight into the enemy's current status and activities as well as future intentions. SIGINT is one of the primary means for providing I&W of enemy actions. It is also a principal contributor to intelligence support to command and control warfare (C2W) through its analysis and exploitation of the enemy's C2 system. The principal limitations of SIGINT are that the enemy must transmit signals that can be exploited and that collection assets must be capable of intercepting and positioned to intercept those signals.

## **c. HUMINT**

HUMINT is "a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources." (Joint Pub 1-02) HUMINT operations cover a wide range of activities, including reconnaissance patrols, aircrew reports and debriefs, debriefing of refugees, interrogations of prisoners of war, and the conduct of CI force protection source operations. Principal dedicated HUMINT resources are ground reconnaissance units; the CI and interrogator-translator assets of the MEF CI/HUMINT company; and national, theater, and other-Service HUMINT elements. In addition, all Marines participating in an operation can obtain significant information about the threat and environment; intelligence operations must aggressively employ Marines as HUMINT sources by teaching them the importance of observing and reporting. HUMINT can provide insight into intangible factors such as tactics, training, morale, and combat effectiveness that cannot be collected by technical means (IMINT or SIGINT) and offers the best potential source to discern future plans and intentions. HUMINT is particularly important in military operations other than war (MOOTW), in which the

nature of the mission and of the threat generally provide a lucrative environment for HUMINT operations. HUMINT has two main limitations. First, HUMINT operations generally require placing humans at risk to gain access to their targets. For that reason, we attempt to satisfy requirements through technical collection means before we consider the use of human resources. Second, the responsiveness of HUMINT can be limited in certain circumstances because of the time it takes to plan the activities, position the assets, collect the data from what are often hostile or noncooperative sources, and report the information to exploitation and production centers, which are often located a significant distance from the collection site.

## **d. Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)**

MASINT is intelligence information gathered by technical instruments such as radars, passive electro-optical sensors, radiation detectors, and remote ground sensors. Although the primary tactical application of these devices is to collect sensor data, which is generally provided directly to operations centers for immediate decisionmaking, the data collected can also provide significant intelligence information on enemy movements and activities. Key MAGTF MASINT capabilities are remote ground sensors, weapons locating radars, and air surveillance radars. These sensors provide an efficient means to maintain surveillance over large portions of the battlespace. Their limitations include the logistic support required to maintain the equipment, the requirement to place the sensors in proximity to the surveillance area, and the exploitable electronic signatures associated with some of the sensors.

## **e. Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT)**

OSINT is "information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public." (Joint Pub 1-02) OSINT sources include books, magazines, newspapers, maps, commercial electronic networks and databases, and radio and television broadcasts. OSINT involves no information that is classified at its origin or acquired through controlled collection. National and theater intelligence production centers have access to a range of

OSINT sources. MAGTF intelligence agencies can receive OSINT through these centers in addition to collecting information from open sources that are available in the area of operations. OSINT can be a valuable source of geographic, political, economic, sociological, and cultural information, particularly in security, humanitarian assistance, or peace operations. During multinational operations, OSINT provides intelligence that can be readily shared with members of a multinational force. However, the sources of OSINT should be carefully evaluated to determine the accuracy and reliability of the information provided.

### 3006. Processing and Exploitation

Processing and exploitation involves the conversion of collected data into information that is suitable for the production of intelligence. Processing is largely a technical function that does not add meaning to the data but that is necessary to convert the data into a form that people can understand. Examples of processing include developing a piece of film, translating a document or communications intercept from a foreign language, or converting electronic data into a standardized report that can be analyzed by a system operator. Some types of data require minimal processing; they may be collected in a form that is already suitable for production. Processing may also take place automatically during collection. Other types of data require extensive processing, which can affect the timeliness and accuracy of the resulting information. In addition to processing, during this phase data may be further exploited to gain the fullest possible advantage. For example, an aerial photograph or a frame of UAV video may be exploited by imagery interpreters to identify specific pieces of equipment or measure the dimensions of structures found on that image. When resources are required to accomplish the processing and exploitation phase, it is crucial that processing requirements be prioritized and managed according to the PIRs to ensure that critical information is extracted first.

### 3007. Production


Production is the activity that converts information into intelligence. It involves the evaluation, interpretation,

integration, analysis, and synthesis of all information that is relevant to a particular IR to answer the question that has been asked. Production fuses new information and existing intelligence from all sources to provide meaningful knowledge that can be applied to the decisionmaking process. During the production phase, information is:

- Evaluated to determine pertinence, reliability, and accuracy
- Analyzed to isolate significant elements
- Integrated with other relevant information and previously developed intelligence
- Interpreted to form logical conclusions that bear on the situation and support the commander's decisionmaking process
- Applied to estimate possible outcomes
- Placed into the product format that will be most useful to its eventual user.

#### a. IPB

IPB is the primary analytical methodology used to produce intelligence in support of the decisionmaking process. In addition, it furnishes a framework for the integration of intelligence and operations throughout the PDE&A cycle. IPB is a systematic, continuous, mission-focused process of analyzing the environment and the threat in a specific geographic area. (See figure 3-9.)



**Figure 3-9. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.**

IPB provides a means to interpret information and understand the battlespace that can be applied in any operational situation. Through the IPB process, information that has been collected and processed is analyzed, synthesized, and used to estimate possible outcomes that can affect mission accomplishment. The result is knowledge-based intelligence that is incorporated into a variety of intelligence products.

Although IPB is fundamentally an intelligence process, successful application of the process to support planning and execution depends on the participation of the commander and the entire staff. The commander is responsible for intelligence production and IPB. The commander focuses the IPB effort by defining the area and key factors to be studied. The commander's guidance and the complete involvement of the staff are necessary to ensure that the IPB effort encompasses aspects of concern for all warfighting functions and provides detailed and accurate intelligence for both COA development and detailed planning. Finally, the commander ensures that the IPB process is fully integrated with mission planning and execution; IPB is an effective tool only when the results are used to develop plans and support decisionmaking during execution.

IPB emphasizes providing intelligence in the form of graphics and images—formats that help the commander to rapidly visualize, assimilate, and apply the intelligence in the decisionmaking process. During planning, products generated from IPB place large volumes of intelligence in context, providing situational awareness for everyone involved in the planning effort. In addition, these products form the basis of, or are combined with, the planning tools and decision support aids prepared by other staff sections to provide an integrated planning and execution support product. During execution, the use of graphics to display intelligence increases the commander's ability to discern patterns as they are emerging and to conduct intuitive decisionmaking, thereby increasing operational tempo.

## **b. Levels of Production**

Intelligence production can be extremely simple or incredibly complex. At the MAGTF CE level, particularly during deliberate planning, production normally entails

the development of detailed, all-source estimates and studies through the combined efforts of several intelligence support elements. During tactical execution, time constraints and the demands of the ongoing battle require rapid processing and production, with an emphasis on development of simple, mission-focused intelligence products such as a hand-annotated image of a helicopter landing zone (HLZ), a target description, or an overlay depicting current and future enemy dispositions. An enlisted intelligence specialist on duty in an infantry battalion CP may develop dozens of intelligence products during his watch in the form of answers to questions concerning the enemy situation, targets, or terrain to be traversed. Valuable intelligence does not result solely from the investment of time or resources; rather, it is developed by placing relevant information in context, converting it into knowledge through analysis and synthesis, and applying that knowledge to the decisionmaking process.

There is inherent friction between the desire to provide as complete and accurate an intelligence product as possible and the continuous requirement to support the time-sensitive urgency of tactical decisionmaking. In practice, these conflicting demands must be balanced by using both stated direction, such as the commander's intent and PIRs, and knowledge of the operational situation to determine when to finish and disseminate the product. To provide a framework to make these determinations, intelligence production can be viewed as occurring on two levels.

*Deliberate production* is employed when there is sufficient time to thoroughly evaluate, analyze, and synthesize all available information and produce a formal intelligence product such as a written intelligence estimate, scheduled report, or detailed target/objective area study.

*Immediate production* is conducted to identify, process, and place in context elements of data, information, and intelligence that have a direct effect on ongoing or near-term operations. These elements are subjected to a compressed version of the production process, and the resulting product is rapidly disseminated to those who are affected. Immediate production is normally conducted during execution and results in simple, mission-

specific intelligence products: situational assessments or answers to specific, individual IRs. There is no absolute distinction between the two levels; the nature of the situation and pertinent IRs will dictate the amount of time available to complete each production effort. Likewise, IPB methodology should be used during both types of production; however, during immediate production, a rapid mental evaluation and integration of the relevant factors of the threat and environment are used, usually building on a deliberate production effort that has already been completed.

### 3008. Dissemination

Dissemination is the timely conveyance of intelligence to users in an appropriate form. Many times, intelligence operations are focused almost exclusively on the collection and production phases, with the intelligence cycle often breaking down because insufficient attention is given to the dissemination phase. In intelligence operations, dissemination must be planned and supervised *to the same degree* as collection and production, or we risk failure of the intelligence support function. Determination of the form and selection of the means to deliver the product are key aspects of the dissemination process.

#### a. Form

Determination of the form to be used in disseminating the intelligence product is a function of several factors: the purpose of the intelligence product, the urgency and relevance of the intelligence to ongoing operations, the type and volume of the intelligence, and the dissemination means available. Because decisionmaking is a mental process and human beings think and understand primarily in the form of images, the goal of intelligence dissemination is to convey an accurate image of the battlespace or threat to the decisionmaker in a form that facilitates rapid understanding of that image. For this reason, graphics are the preferred dissemination form. (See figures 3-10 and 3-11.)

Although oral briefings and written reports are the primary dissemination forms used today, the use of automated systems is increasing the capability to develop graphic products. Imagery, overlays, diagrams, and

schematics enhanced with appropriate textual data and annotations will be used as the baseline dissemination format whenever possible. However, in time-sensitive situations, the verbal report or short text message may be the most expeditious dissemination form. Whether oral, text, or graphic, intelligence products should use standard formats whenever possible; standard formats facilitate ease of preparation and dissemination, as well as usability of the intelligence product.

#### b. Means

Delivery of the intelligence product to the right person in a timely manner is directly related to the choice of the means used to disseminate that product. Dissemination is managed by using a combination of methods, channels, and modes to convey the product to the user.

**(1) Methods.** There are two basic methods used to disseminate intelligence: *supply-push* and *demand-pull*. A supply-push system pushes intelligence from the collectors/producers to the users as it becomes available. The main advantage to this method is that users do not have to initiate requests to receive products. However, there is potential for information overload in a supply-push system. To prevent information overload, the dissemination node should tailor what it is passing through the system, not simply dump everything that it has received or developed. The demand-pull mode provides access to intelligence on an as-needed basis. The user draws the required intelligence from the intelligence support system through a series of searches or inquiries. The use of demand-pull decreases the volume of intelligence being transmitted and diminishes the possibility of overwhelming units with superfluous products; however, demand-pull can also reduce the timeliness of dissemination by developing and providing intelligence only after a request has been received. The dissemination system must provide the flexibility to use either method, “pushing” important or time-sensitive intelligence directly to the users, while at the same time permitting them to “pull” other relevant intelligence as needed from readily accessible sources such as a database or a watch section at an intelligence center.




Figure 3-10. Graphic Climatology Study.




Figure 3-11. Graphic Intelligence Estimate.

**(2) Channels.** Intelligence is disseminated by using two types of channels: *standard* and *alarm*. Standard dissemination is used for routine intelligence and is transmitted according to a set order and format, usually along established command or staff channels. Examples include the formal staff briefing and standardized reports. The alarm channel is used to disseminate critical, time-sensitive intelligence that can have an immediate effect on the conduct of the operation, such as I&W of hostile activity. I&W alarms must be disseminated rapidly to all units that are affected by that intelligence. Although the standard channel is used to satisfy the majority of dissemination requirements, care must be taken to monitor the flow of what is passing through the pipeline to ensure that the intelligence provided is timely and pertinent to the units receiving it. A particularly important connection that is often neglected in standard dissemination is *lateral dissemination*; intelligence must flow laterally between units as well as up and down the chain of command. The exchange of intelligence between the GCE, aviation combat element (ACE), and combat service support element (CSSE) is an especially important link in ensuring that all commanders have a shared picture of the battlespace.

**(3) Modes.** Finally, intelligence is disseminated in one of two modes: *broadcast* or *point-to-point*. In broadcast dissemination, intelligence that affects the majority of units is sent simultaneously to a broad audience. Examples include I&W alarms, intelligence products developed by the MAGTF G-2 section that support the entire MAGTF, and reporting from organic collection assets. Successful use of the broadcast mode depends on several factors, including judicious selection of what intelligence is broadcast, the ability of the appropriate users to monitor the broadcast, and the employment of a processing methodology or system to filter and select for detailed examination only those broadcast items that are pertinent to the user's requirements. Undisciplined use of this mode can quickly lead to information overload. In the point-to-point mode, intelligence is sent to a specific user or users, normally in response to a specific request or requirement, and is passed along sequentially as appropriate. Dissemination across the system is slower but is more focused and can provide intelligence that is tailored to the needs of each individual unit.

### c. Architectures

Intelligence architectures provide the means to disseminate intelligence. (See figure 3-12.) Dissemination planning analyzes and anticipates the dissemination requirements and designs the appropriate architecture to meet those requirements. The architecture should employ all methods, channels, and modes in a flexible, integrated system. The objective is to provide the right intelligence to the appropriate user in a timely manner, while at the same time not overwhelming him with a massive amount of unfocused data. Architectures will be developed with the objective of facilitating the exchange of *graphic* intelligence throughout the force, down to the lowest tactical echelon. The means will consist of a combination of procedures, information systems, and communications networks, effectively supervised by intelligence specialists to ensure that the dissemination requirements are being satisfied. The intelligence architecture must be interoperable with the overall communications-information systems architecture employed by the MAGTF and the joint force.


### 3009. Utilization

Intelligence has no inherent value; its value is realized through its support to operations. Thus, the intelligence cycle is not complete until the intelligence that has been developed is used in decisionmaking during planning and/or execution. The commander is responsible for the effective use of intelligence and for ensuring that decisions are based on the foundation provided by intelligence. The intelligence officer facilitates the effective use of intelligence, supervises the entire intelligence development effort, and assists the commander and the staff in understanding the intelligence product and its application.

The utilization phase also provides the basis for the continuous functioning of the intelligence cycle. On the one hand, utilization will determine whether a requirement has been completely satisfied; requirements that have not been met will require additional intelligence development efforts. On the other hand, the satisfaction of one requirement normally generates new or additional requirements, the answers to which are needed to

further refine or focus the decisionmaking process. In either case, utilization provides guidance and feedback that are used to initiate the next iteration of the cycle.






### 3010. Application of the Intelligence Cycle

The intelligence cycle is a procedural framework for the development of mission-focused intelligence support. It is not an end in itself, nor should it be viewed as a rigid set of procedures that must be carried out in an identical manner on all occasions. Rather, the commander and the intelligence officer must consider each IR individually and apply the intelligence cycle in a manner that develops the required intelligence in the most effective way.

The application of the intelligence cycle will vary with the phase of the PDE&A cycle. In theory, a unique

iteration of the intelligence cycle is carried out for each individual requirement. In practice, particularly during the planning phase, requirements are grouped together and satisfied through a single, concurrent intelligence development process. During the planning phase, intelligence development is generally carried out through two major iterations of the intelligence cycle. The first primarily supports decision planning. Completion of this iteration of the intelligence cycle results in the preparation and use of basic intelligence products—an intelligence estimate, supporting studies, and IPB analysis—that describe the battlespace and threat; these products form the basis for development and selection of COAs. The second iteration of the intelligence cycle



**Figure 3-13. Application of the Intelligence Cycle.**

supports execution planning.<sup>1</sup> It is an outgrowth of the selection of the COA and formulation of a concept of operations; the implementation of the collection plan, refinement of IPB analysis, and generation of mission-specific intelligence products are integrated with the concept of operations to support mission execution. During execution, requirements are satisfied on a more individualized basis. New requirements are usually generated in response to a specific operational need. Each requirement is unique and must be satisfied in a timely manner to facilitate rapid decisionmaking and the generation or maintenance of tempo. (See figure 3-13.)

The intelligence cycle will also be applied differently depending on the mission and the organizational level of

the unit. For example, a MAGTF G-2 section will normally have a separate section that is specifically responsible for each phase of the intelligence cycle—a collections section, processing and exploitation agencies, a production element, and a dissemination section—with an intelligence operations section providing planning and direction for the overall effort. At the MAGTF level, intelligence is normally developed to satisfy multiple requirements concurrently, with simultaneous collection, processing, production, and utilization efforts being carried out by the separate functional sections. In contrast, a battalion or squadron S-2 section must carry out the cycle with a limited number of resources. It will generally focus on a single requirement or a small number of closely related requirements,

<sup>1</sup> Decision and execution planning are defined and discussed in MCDP 5, *Planning*, pp. 43-44.

moving through each phase of the cycle sequentially until that requirement is satisfied.

### 3011. Counterintelligence

CI is the function of intelligence that is concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat posed by hostile intelligence capabilities and by organizations or individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism. The objective of CI is to enhance the security of the command by denying an adversary information that might be used to conduct effective operations against friendly forces and to protect the command by identifying and neutralizing espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism efforts.

#### a. Responsibilities

CI, like all intelligence matters, is a command responsibility. In preparing for operations, all units must develop a CI plan and implement appropriate CI measures to protect themselves from potential threats. The unit intelligence officer plans, implements, and supervises the CI effort for the commander. The G-2/S-2 may have access to or request support from MAGTF CI units and specialists to assist in developing CI estimates and plans. All members of the command are involved in executing the CI plan and implementing appropriate CI measures. Key participants in this process and their specific responsibilities are:

- G-3/S-3—overall security and force protection, operations security (OPSEC), counterreconnaissance, and deception
- G-6/S-6—communications-information systems security
- G-1/S-1—information security
- Headquarters commandant—physical security of unit CP and echelons.

#### b. CI Planning

CI planning at all levels is conducted by using a standard methodology that consists of three steps: developing a CI estimate, conducting a CI survey, and developing the CI plan.

**(1) The CI Estimate.** The CI estimate details the capabilities and limitations of hostile intelligence, subversive, and terrorist organizations that could carry out actions against friendly units and facilities or against individuals, groups, or locations of concern to our forces, such as the local population or civilian organizations operating in the area. It also provides an estimate of possible and probable COAs that these threat organizations will adopt. Intelligence and CI analysts of the MAGTF CE and CI/HUMINT company will normally prepare a comprehensive CI estimate that addresses threats to the MARFOR or MAGTF by using an IPB methodology that is focused on CI factors and the CI threat. However, each level of command must conduct its own evaluation to determine which of the adversary's capabilities identified in the MAGTF CI estimate represent a threat to their particular unit. The CI estimate must be updated on a regular basis, and the revised estimate or appropriate CI warning reports must be disseminated to all units involved in the operation.

**(2) The CI Survey.** The CI survey assesses a unit's security posture against the threats detailed in the CI estimate. The CI survey should identify vulnerabilities to specific hostile intelligence, espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorist capabilities and provide recommendations on how to eliminate or minimize these vulnerabilities. The survey should be as detailed as possible. During the planning phase of an operation, it may be possible to do a formal, written survey. CI specialists from the CI/HUMINT company may be available to assist in this effort. In a time-compressed situation, the survey will likely result from a brief discussion between the appropriate intelligence, operations, communications, and security personnel. In either case, it is critical that the survey look forward in both space and time to support the development of the CI measures necessary to protect the unit as it carries out successive phases of the operation; that is, the survey makes recommendations to improve the CI posture of the command both now and in the future.

**(3) The CI Plan.** The CI plan details the activities and operations that the command will use to counter the CI threat. It includes procedures for detecting and monitoring the activities of hostile intelligence and terrorist


organizations and directs the implementation of active and passive measures that are intended to protect the force from these activities. The CI plan is based on the threats identified in the CI estimate and the vulnerabilities detected by the CI survey. The MAGTF staff CI officer normally prepares a detailed, comprehensive CI plan that addresses the entire MAGTF. Included in the MAGTF CI plan are details of the employment of dedicated CI capabilities and the conduct of specialized CI operations intended to detect and neutralize or eliminate specific CI threats. Plans of subordinate MAGTF elements closely follow the MAGTF plan, normally adding only security measures that are applicable to their specific units. As with all plans, CI plans must be continually updated to ensure that they are current and support both ongoing and future operations.

### c. CI Measures

CI measures encompass a broad range of activities designed to protect against the CI threat. There are two general categories of CI measures: active and passive. Active CI measures are those measures that are designed to neutralize or eliminate the hostile intelligence effort and adversary sabotage, subversion, and terrorism capabilities. Counterreconnaissance operations and deception activities are examples of active measures that are routinely employed by all units. Complex active CI measures such as counterespionage operations, counterterrorism operations, screening and interrogations, and defensive source operations are conducted only by CI personnel or other specialized organizations following the direction of the joint force and/or MAGTF commander. Passive CI measures are designed to conceal and deny information to the enemy and protect personnel and installations from sabotage, subversion, and terrorism. Camouflage, security of classified material, emission control, information systems security, noise and light discipline, and physical access control are examples of passive CI measures that are employed extensively by all units.

The CI process is summarized in figure 3-14. For further details on CI responsibilities, planning, measures,

and operations, see MCWP 2-5/Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 3-25, *Counterintelligence*.<sup>2</sup>



**Figure 3-14. The CI Process.**

<sup>2</sup>

MCWP 2-5 is scheduled for publication by the end of fiscal year 1998.

## Chapter 4

# Concept of MAGTF Intelligence Support

*“To lack intelligence is to be in the ring blindfolded.”*

— Gen David M. Shoup, USMC

### 4001. Overview

Marine Corps operational forces are organized for combat as MAGTFs. Marine intelligence operations are conducted primarily to facilitate the planning and execution of MAGTF operations through the development of tactical intelligence. The concept of MAGTF intelligence support ensures that the required intelligence is available to commanders at all levels throughout the force in time to influence their decisionmaking process. Key elements of this concept are:

- Fully manned and capable organic intelligence sections down to the maneuver battalion/squadron level
- Direction of the intelligence effort and maintenance of a robust collection, production, and dissemination capability at the MAGTF level
- Employment of specialized intelligence units to provide dedicated collection, processing, exploitation, and production of all-source intelligence
- Creation of key intelligence nodes at any level to concentrate intelligence support at critical times and locations (these nodes are created through task organization, split-basing, and the use of intelligence direct support teams.<sup>1</sup>)
- Full use of the intelligence support available from national, theater, joint, other-Service component,

and multinational forces to enhance MAGTF intelligence capabilities

- Augmentation from global sourcing (noncommitted operating forces, the supporting establishment, and the Reserves) to enhance intelligence support to the warfighting MAGTF.

This intelligence support concept provides organic intelligence sections to commanders at all levels; these intelligence sections develop intelligence to satisfy their units' unique requirements. They use this intelligence to support their commander's tactical decisionmaking process and to generate tailored intelligence products to facilitate mission execution.

Unit intelligence sections are supported by a primary MAGTF intelligence node that is capable of performing all types of intelligence operations. The MAGTF G-2, through its combat intelligence center (CIC), provides centralized direction for the collection, production, and dissemination efforts of organic and supporting intelligence assets and ensures that these efforts remain focused on satisfying the PIRs that are essential to mission success. The concentration of specialized intelligence capabilities in the radio battalion and the intelligence, force reconnaissance, and CI/HUMINT companies under this centralized direction facilitates unity of effort, effective employment of limited assets,

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<sup>1</sup> An intelligence direct support team provides enhanced intelligence capability to a supported intelligence section. A direct support team consists of one officer and several enlisted intelligence specialists. Direct support teams are organic to the MEF and each of the MSC G-2 sections. For more information on direct support teams, see Paragraph 4005.d.

and the collection and production of all-source intelligence.

The concept of intelligence support acknowledges the need to focus intelligence efforts in support of particular elements of the MAGTF during different phases of an operation. The MAGTF intelligence structure has the flexibility to provide such focused support through the use of task organization. Enhanced support can be provided by placing intelligence assets in direct support and employing direct support teams.

Recognizing that organic intelligence capabilities may be limited in particular environments, the MAGTF has the ability to draw on the full range of national, theater, joint, other-Service, and allied intelligence assets. When made available, these capabilities will be fully integrated into MAGTF intelligence operations. If a separate Marine component headquarters is established, it will support the MAGTF by performing those intelligence functions not directly related to warfighting, to include conducting detailed operational-level intelligence planning, providing Marine intelligence liaison to JTF and other component intelligence elements, monitoring the status of MAGTF intelligence collection and production requests for supporting and external support requirements, planning the development and monitoring the adequacy of the JTF/MAGTF's intelligence architectures and the flow of intelligence to the MAGTF, and supporting Marine participation in intelligence support to the joint targeting process. If a separate Marine component headquarters is not established, then the MAGTF CE's CIC will perform these functions. MSCs and other MAGTF elements will be able to access these external capabilities through the MAGTF intelligence architecture to pull available intelligence products on demand. In addition, specialized intelligence units (e.g., radio battalion or CI/HUMINT companies) will have connectivity with appropriate external agencies to coordinate tasking or support.

Finally, any MAGTF that is committed to an operation can be supported by intelligence assets of non-deployed MAGTFs, the supporting establishment, or the Reserves. This support could consist of augmentation to fill shortfalls in manpower, equipment, or specialized capabilities as well as assistance in the development of intelligence in response to a Service-unique

requirement. Flexibility to draw on assets from across the Marine Corps provides the ability to tailor and enhance particular intelligence capabilities on the basis of the requirements of the committed MAGTF commander. (See figure 4-1.)


## 4002. Role of the Organic Intelligence Section

Most commands from the battalion/squadron level and above in the operational forces have an organic intelligence section. The unit intelligence officer and section occupy the central role in the concept of MAGTF intelligence support. They focus the intelligence effort to develop, disseminate, and ensure effective use of intelligence in support of tactical operations. Intelligence drives operations and remains responsive to mission requirements through close and direct contact with the commander, key staff officers, and subordinate unit leaders; the organic intelligence section provides this critical linkage.

### a. The Unit Intelligence Officer

The commander directs the intelligence effort. The intelligence officer manages this effort for the commander, acting as the principal advisor on intelligence and implementing activities that carry out the commander's intelligence responsibilities. *The intelligence officer is a full participant in the commander's decisionmaking process, ensuring that intelligence is effectively used throughout the command during all phases of mission planning and execution.* Key responsibilities of the intelligence officer are to:

- Facilitate understanding and use of intelligence in the planning and execution of operations
- Support situation development and the commander's estimate of the situation through the identification of enemy capabilities, strengths, and vulnerabilities as well as opportunities and limitations presented by the environment
- Assist the commander in developing PIRs



**Figure 4-1. Concept of Intelligence Support.**

- Ensure that the command's IRs are received, understood, and acted on by organic and supporting intelligence assets
- Supervise the development and dissemination of all-source intelligence products that are tailored to the unit's mission and concept of operations
- Monitor the effective flow of intelligence throughout the command
- Provide BDA data and analysis to assist the combat assessment process.
- Develop and maintain a comprehensive intelligence estimate
- Tailor intelligence produced at all levels to meet specific unit requirements
- Formulate collection plans and support requests to satisfy unit PIRs and IRs
- Maintain an accurate image of the battlespace and enemy situation
- Prepare target analysis and target intelligence products
- Recommend CI and force protection measures
- Provide linkage to supporting intelligence assets.

### **b. The Intelligence Section**

The unit intelligence section supports the commander, the intelligence officer, and the entire command through the production and dissemination of mission-oriented intelligence products. Primary functions of the intelligence section are to:

- Conduct IPB analysis for the unit's area of operations and interest

Each organic intelligence section performs all six intelligence functions described in Paragraph 1007.; however, the priority and level of effort applied to the different functions will vary with the type of unit, level of command, and assigned mission. For example, an infantry battalion S-2 section will normally focus on support of the commander's estimate and situation development, while the S-2 of a combat service support

(CSS) unit may concentrate on support of force protection, and the intelligence section of a fixed-wing Marine aircraft group usually places priority on support of targeting and combat assessment (particularly BDA).

### c. Required Capabilities

To carry out these responsibilities, organic intelligence sections must have the following capabilities:

- Sufficient manning to carry out assigned responsibilities
- Training in all aspects of tactical intelligence development, with an emphasis on the production of tailored, all-source, mission-specific intelligence products
- Organic collection, processing, production, and dissemination assets appropriate to its mission and level of command
- Connectivity to other MAGTF intelligence assets to provide a common picture of the battlespace, receive warning and other critical intelligence, and achieve access for the “pulling” of pertinent intelligence in response to unit requirements
- Formation as a base for the development of a larger intelligence support node, task-organized to provide expanded intelligence capabilities during particular phases of an operation.

### 4003. The MAGTF Intelligence Section

The MAGTF intelligence section that is resident in the MAGTF CE is the focal point for intelligence operations and development in the MAGTF.

The MAGTF G-2/S-2, supported by the CIC and its subordinate sections, provides centralized direction for the MAGTF’s comprehensive intelligence effort. (See figure 4-2.) The G-2/S-2 serves as the intelligence officer for the MAGTF commander, and the CIC serves as the primary intelligence node for the *entire* MAGTF; as such, the CIC *must* remain responsive to the requirements of *all elements* of the MAGTF. In this intelligence support concept, the MAGTF intelligence section performs the following tasks:

- Provides centralized direction for MAGTF intelligence operations
- Plans and implements a concept for intelligence support based on the mission, concept of operations, and commander’s intent
- Consolidates, validates, and prioritizes IRs of the entire force
- Recommends MAGTF PIRs to the MAGTF commander
- Maintains a consolidated, all-source production center in the MAGTF all-source fusion center (AFC)
- Plans, develops, and directs the MAGTF collection, production, and dissemination plans and operations
- Directs the employment of MAGTF organic collection assets through the surveillance and reconnaissance center (SARC) and the operations control and analysis center (OCAC)
- Submits consolidated requests for external intelligence support through the Marine component headquarters to appropriate agencies
- Links the MAGTF to national, theater, joint, other-Service, and multinational intelligence assets and operations
- Prepares a comprehensive CI plan with recommended force protection measures
- Supervises the execution of appropriate CI offensive and defensive operations.



**CIC**—intelligence operations center established within the MAGTF CP. Performs primary functions of the MAGTF intelligence section and includes the subelements listed below.

**AFC**—primary analysis and production element of the MAGTF. Processes and produces all-source intelligence products in response to requirements of the MAGTF.

**SARC**—primary element for the supervision of MAGTF collection operations. Directs, coordinates, and monitors intelligence collection operations conducted by organic, attached, and direct support collection assets.

**OCAC**—main node for the C2 of radio battalion SIGINT operations and the overall coordination of MAGTF SIGINT operations. Processes, analyzes, produces, and disseminates SIGINT-derived information and directs the ground-based electronic warfare (EW) activities of the radio battalion.

**Figure 4-2. MAGTF Intelligence Section Elements.**

#### 4004. MAGTF Intelligence Units

The limited number of specialized intelligence assets, coupled with the requirement to integrate and focus intelligence operations on the satisfaction of the command's PIRs, creates the need for centralized management. Intelligence units whose capabilities support the entire MAGTF are retained under the operational control (OPCON) of the MAGTF commander; the MAGTF commander exercises this OPCON through his G-2/S-2.<sup>2</sup> The MAGTF G-2/S-2 provides centralized direction for these assets and facilitates unity

of effort, the production of all-source intelligence, and the effective use of limited resources in support of the requirements of the entire force. Direction is provided primarily through MAGTF-level intelligence C2 agencies (e.g., the SARC and the OCAC). Subordinate elements of the MAGTF retain organic intelligence assets and OPCON appropriate to their mission and level of command (e.g., division ground reconnaissance units remain under the OPCON of the division commander).

##### a. MAGTF-Level Intelligence Units<sup>3</sup>

**(1) Radio Battalion.** The radio battalion provides ground-based SIGINT, EW, communications security monitoring, and special intelligence communications capability to support MAGTF operations. In addition to directing the employment of its subordinate elements, the radio battalion is the focal point for MAGTF ground-based SIGINT operations; it plans and coordinates these activities through the OCAC.

**(2) Intelligence Company.** The intelligence company provides remote sensor, imagery interpretation, and topographic intelligence support to MAGTF operations. In addition to the sensor control and management platoon (SCAMP), the force imagery interpretation unit (FIU), and the topographic platoon, the intelligence company provides two intelligence direct support teams for tasking and employment by the MAGTF G-2. The company headquarters assists the SRIG headquarters in establishing and manning the SARC.

**(3) CI/HUMINT Company.** The CI/HUMINT company provides HUMINT, CI, and interrogator-translator support to MAGTF operations. This support encompasses the full range of tactical CI and HUMINT operations, including screening operations,

<sup>2</sup> Certain intelligence units are capable of performing operational tasks in addition to their primary intelligence functions. For example, a force reconnaissance team may carry out a laser target designation mission, or a UAV may be used to assist in maneuver control. Likewise, radio battalion may support maneuver and fires through electronic attack operations. When performing operations tasking, the MAGTF G-3/S-3 will exercise OPCON over the assets that are carrying out the specified tasking.

<sup>3</sup> The current organization of MAGTF intelligence units consists of an intelligence company, a CI/HUMINT company, a force reconnaissance company, and a radio battalion within the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (SRIG). Discussions regarding various intelligence and reconnaissance organizational matters are currently under consideration.

interrogation/debriefing of prisoners of war and persons of intelligence interest, conduct of CI force protection source operations, conduct of CI surveys and investigations, preparation of CI estimates and plans, translation of documents, and limited exploitation of captured material. In addition to the specialized CI and interrogator-translator platoons, the company employs task-organized HUMINT exploitation teams in direct support of MAGTF subordinate elements. HUMINT exploitation teams combine CI specialists and interrogator-translators in one element, thereby providing a unique range of CI/HUMINT services to the supported unit.

**(4) Force Reconnaissance Company.** The force reconnaissance company conducts preassault and deep postassault reconnaissance and surveillance in support of MAGTF operations. The company uses specialized insertion, patrolling, reporting, and extraction techniques to carry out amphibious and deep reconnaissance and surveillance tasks in support of the MAGTF. In addition, the company has the capability to perform a variety of other operational tasks. When a conflict exists between the requirements for reconnaissance and surveillance and other missions, the MAGTF commander determines the priority of tasking for the company on the basis of the recommendations from the G-2/S-2 and G-3/S-3.

**(5) UAV Squadron.** UAV squadrons provide day-night, real-time imagery reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition in support of the MAGTF. The unique capabilities of the UAV can also be used to support target engagement, assisting in the control of fires/supporting arms and maneuver. The squadrons are under the administrative control of the Marine air wing (MAW); however, because of the limited number of assets and the critical capabilities that they provide to the entire force, the MAGTF commander retains OPCON of the UAV squadrons. OPCON of the UAV squadrons is exercised by the G-2/S-2 through the SARC.

## **b. Employment of MAGTF Intelligence Units**

MAGTF intelligence units are employed to meet the requirements of the entire force. The MAGTF G-2/S-2 develops a concept of intelligence support, which employs these units on the basis of the MAGTF mission, PIRs, concept of operations, and commander's intent. This concept must integrate intelligence activities with operations to provide key intelligence to commanders to enable rapid and effective decisionmaking. Based on the results of IPB analysis and the concept of operations, assets are positioned to satisfy PIRs, expose enemy vulnerabilities, monitor key locations, detect and assist in the engagement of targets, and identify opportunities as they arise in the battlespace.

Intelligence units are employed in either *general* or *direct support*. Under general support, units are tasked by the MAGTF commander through his G-2/S-2 to satisfy the requirements of the entire force. Because of the limited number of specialized intelligence assets and their ability to develop intelligence that is relevant to both current and future operations in all areas of the battlespace (deep, close, and rear), general support is the preferred support relationship. Under direct support, the requirements of a supported commander are given priority. Direct support is used to focus intelligence support for particular phases of an operation or to create enhanced intelligence nodes in support of MAGTF subordinate elements, as described in Paragraph 4005. When MAGTFs smaller than a full MEF are deployed, they will normally be supported by attached, task-organized detachments from the intelligence company, the force reconnaissance company, the CI/HUMINT company, and the radio battalion.

### **4005. Focused Intelligence Support**

Intelligence must be integrated with the mission, commander's intent, and concept of operations and should normally be weighted to support the main effort. The MAGTF intelligence structure has the flexibility to tailor its capabilities to meet the requirements of various types of expeditionary operations, as well as to adapt to changing operational needs during the execution of an operation. For each operation, the MAGTF G-2/S-2 will assess the IRs and develop a concept of intelligence

support that positions assets where they can best satisfy those requirements. Intelligence nodes will be used to focus support within the MAGTF. Split-basing will be used to build intelligence nodes within and outside the area of operations to deliver comprehensive and reliable intelligence support while reducing the size of the deployed force. Intelligence units and direct support teams are employed to tailor and enhance the capabilities of organic intelligence sections or to create task-organized intelligence nodes in response to specific requirements.

### **a. Intelligence Nodes**

The MAGTF can create a series of intelligence nodes, thereby providing focused intelligence support to specific units or areas based on the tactical situation. In the concept of intelligence support, the MAGTF G-2/S-2, in conjunction with the MSC intelligence officers, task organizes the MAGTF's intelligence units and uses intelligence direct support teams to deliver the required intelligence capabilities at key points and times. Although these nodes normally support a specific unit, they can also be used in an area-support mode in which an intelligence node is established to support all units operating in a particular sector of the battlespace. For example, during sustained operations ashore, an intelligence node could be built to support units operating in the MAGTF's rear area. Such a node could be built around a direct support team and specialists from the CI/HUMINT company and topographic platoon. This node would support the rear area operations center, CSSE units operating in the area, and any ACE airfield security detachments located within the node's area of responsibility.

### **b. Split-basing**

Intelligence nodes can also be used to tailor the footprint of the intelligence organization within and outside of a designated area of operations. Intelligence assets are positioned where they can best carry out their assigned functions. In many cases, it may not be necessary or desirable to forward deploy the entire MAGTF intelligence structure. The concept of operations, C2 support system, physical space limitations, and resource and/or logistical or other constraints may require the split-basing of intelligence assets. Split-basing is the

positioning of critical capabilities within the area of operations to support the deployed commander and forces, while maintaining in-depth intelligence management, processing, exploitation, analysis, and production elements in rear areas, intermediate support bases, staging areas, or garrison locations. Split-basing can enhance the intelligence effort by providing continued access to sophisticated, nondeployable intelligence capabilities and resources. At the same time, it reduces the footprint of the deployed force, diminishing risk from enemy action and decreasing the administrative and logistic support requirements. Split-basing is especially useful when operations are conducted in areas with minimal infrastructure and support, when there are limitations on the number of personnel who can be deployed within the operating area, or during the deployment phase of an operation when it may not be possible to immediately move all required elements of the intelligence structure to the forward area. However, the advantages of split-basing must be assessed against its costs, particularly its critical dependence on responsive and reliable communications support.

### **c. Task Organization of Intelligence Support Units**

Task organization of intelligence support units is one of the principal means for the MAGTF commander to shape the intelligence effort. The collection, exploitation, and unique production capabilities of specialized intelligence units significantly enhance the ability of supported G-2/S-2 sections to develop timely, mission-focused intelligence. Intelligence company, CI/HUMINT company, force reconnaissance company, and radio battalion elements are task-organized to provide tailored intelligence capabilities; the specific capabilities provided are based on the threat, the supported unit's anticipated requirements (as determined through IPB), and the concept of operations. Elements from some or all of the intelligence company's subordinate platoons are combined into intelligence company detachments. The CI/HUMINT company provides HUMINT exploitation teams or mission-focused CI or interrogator-translator detachments. The radio battalion forms task-organized SIGINT/EW support units (SSUs), which provide a mix of SIGINT and EW capabilities. When MAGTFs smaller than a full MEF

deploy, an intelligence company detachment, a CI/HUMINT company detachment or HUMINT exploitation team, force reconnaissance platoon(s), and a radio battalion SSU will normally be attached to the MAGTF CE. In MEF operations, when the entire radio battalion, intelligence company, and CI/HUMINT company are employed, detachments, HUMINT exploitation teams, and SSUs may be placed in direct support as required to provide tailored intelligence capabilities or to create an enhanced intelligence node in support of an MSC or other MAGTF element.

#### **d. Intelligence Direct Support Teams**

Intelligence direct support teams are organic to the intelligence company and each of the division, MAW, and force service support group G-2 sections. The teams are made up of one officer and several enlisted personnel who have a mix of intelligence specialty skills. Direct support teams are used to provide an enhanced analytical and dissemination capability to a unit intelligence section and to link the intelligence structure to the supported units. As assigned by the G-2, they augment the supported unit's intelligence section to carry out the following tasks:

- Perform analysis and production in support of future operations
- Tailor AFC and other external source intelligence products to the needs of the supported commander
- Assist in the management of external intelligence support requirements
- Facilitate dissemination of intelligence received from external sources.

The MEF and MSC G-2s use their direct support teams to tailor and focus intelligence support to units designated as the main effort or to create enhanced intelligence nodes at key times and places in the battlespace.

#### **4006. External Intelligence Support to the MAGTF**

#### **a. The MARFOR Component Intelligence Section**

Future military operations will normally be joint operations and may require the establishment of a MARFOR component headquarters. The Marine component is the level of command that deals directly with the joint force commander (JFC)—the theater commander in chief (CINC) or commander, joint task force—for MARFORs assigned to combatant command or the joint task force (JTF). The Marine component functions at the operational level of war to advise and assist the JFC in employing MARFORs while supporting the MAGTF. The Marine component commander coordinates operational actions with the JFC and the other component commanders so that the MAGTF commander can concentrate on warfighting.

**(1) Responsibilities.** The Marine component intelligence section plays a crucial role in supporting the component commander and staff and in facilitating the provision of intelligence support to the MAGTF. The Marine component supports and enhances the planning and execution of MAGTF intelligence operations through close and continuous coordination with the JFC, joint force headquarters, and other component intelligence organizations. The Marine component G-2 section maintains situational awareness and provides a limited analytical capability to support the component future planning responsibility. It does not normally conduct collection operations or engage in detailed, formal intelligence production. It facilitates, but does not control, the flow of intelligence to the MAGTF. The component relieves the MAGTF commander of intelligence functions that are not directly related to warfighting.

**(2) Functions.** The size of the Marine component G-2 section will vary with the size of the JTF and the scope of the operation. For major joint operations, the Marine component intelligence section provides the following functions:

- **Planning.** The intelligence section plans and coordinates component and MAGTF connectivity to national, theater, and JTF intelligence architectures. The Marine component develops the

architecture to provide the MAGTF with timely, tailored national and theater intelligence. In addition, the component G-2 coordinates the provision of additional Service intelligence support (units, personnel, and equipment) to the MAGTF through the Service chain of command.

- **Collection management.** The intelligence section monitors the status of MAGTF collection requests for supporting and external collection resources. The MARFOR leverages joint and national collection resources in support of the MAGTF. It advocates Service component and MAGTF requirements in theater and JTF collection forums and recommends the allocation and tasking of national, JTF, and other component assets to meet MAGTF requirements.
- **Analysis and production.** The intelligence section provides situational awareness to the component commander and staff and limited analysis and production to support the future planning responsibilities of the component headquarters. This function requires the establishment of a watch section and an analytical element that is capable of tailoring operational-level intelligence products to satisfy the needs of component planning cells. In addition, the component G-2 monitors the status of and coordinates support for MAGTF production requirements and requests for intelligence that are submitted to joint force or supporting intelligence agencies.
- **Dissemination.** The intelligence section monitors the adequacy of the intelligence architecture and the flow of intelligence to the MAGTF. Intelligence is disseminated directly to the appropriate MAGTF elements, not through the component headquarters unless specifically required. However, the MARFOR facilitates and accelerates the flow of critical intelligence to the MAGTF. The component intelligence section remains aware of current MAGTF requirements and ensures that intelligence that is developed or received by the theater or JTF that can satisfy those requirements is disseminated to the MAGTF.

- **Support of targeting.** The intelligence section supports Marine component participation in the joint targeting process, including representation at various joint target intelligence and/or targeting forums as required. Performing this function ensures that MAGTF target intelligence collection and production requirements as well as collection requirements for support of combat assessment/BDA are adequately supported.
- **Liaison.** The intelligence section provides liaison elements and personnel augmentation to various JTF and other component intelligence organizations. Liaison elements may be provided to the joint intelligence support element (JISE), other-Service or functional component intelligence sections, the regional SIGINT operations center, the J-2X/HUMINT operations cell/task force CI coordinating authority, other joint intelligence organizations such as the joint interrogation and debriefing center or the joint document exploitation center, and the intelligence elements of various alliance or coalition partners. Liaison teams or personnel augmentation may be sourced from the Marine component G-2 section, Service augmentation to the component G-2 section, the MAGTF, or some combination of the above.

### b. National, Theater, Joint, and Other-Service Intelligence Support


Marine Corps intelligence assets are optimized for the production of tactical intelligence in support of MAGTF operations. National, theater, joint, and other-Service intelligence assets provide unique capabilities that are not duplicated in the MAGTF intelligence support structure. (See figure 4-3 on next page.) The MAGTF has the ability to use external intelligence assets to enhance its organic capabilities, bringing the full range of these resources to bear on MAGTF requirements. The following are key external capabilities that are used to support MAGTF operations:

- National- and theater-level intelligence analysis and production
- Geospatial information and services (GI&S)<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup>

GI&S describes the collection, production, and dissemination of information about the earth. GI&S

- Analysis and production of target intelligence and target materials
- National imagery collection and exploitation
- SIGINT support from the National Security Agency and the U.S. Cryptologic System
- National- and theater-level CI and HUMINT collection
- Liaison elements from national and theater intelligence agencies.



**Figure 4-3. The National Intelligence Community.**

**(1) MAGTF Access to External Support.** The Marine component headquarters or the MAGTF intelligence section will be the focal point for all external intelligence support to the MAGTF. In major joint operations, a Marine Service component headquarters will be established, and the component G-2 performs this function; when no Service component headquarters is established, the MAGTF acts in this role. Intelligence derived from external sources is used to build a replaces the term mapping, charting, and geodesy (MC&G).

common picture of the battlespace and is incorporated into other intelligence products that are provided to all MAGTF elements. In addition, MSCs and other subordinate units will be able to access external intelligence support resources through the MAGTF's intelligence architecture.

**(2) Required Capabilities.** The following capabilities are required to fully use the resources of external intelligence support assets:

- Personnel trained and experienced in the capabilities, limitations, tasking, and employment procedures of external intelligence support assets
- Sufficient, reliable communications-information systems connectivity and interoperability with national, theater, and other-Service intelligence C2 centers and architectures
- The ability to receive, process, and disseminate information gathered by national and theater collection assets
- Integration of Marine intelligence specialists into national, theater, and Service intelligence organizations to articulate Marine Corps capabilities and requirements and to optimize intelligence support to expeditionary forces
- Establishment of liaison between the MARFOR/MAGTF and supporting intelligence agencies through dedicated communications and the exchange of liaison officers.

#### **4007. Role of Residual Forces, the Supporting Establishment, and the Reserves**

##### **a. Residual Forces**

Like all MAGTF components, intelligence support assets are flexible and responsive to a variety of operational missions. They are configured for rapid deployment and can be tailored to meet the requirements of a particular operational situation. Although each MAGTF is furnished with a baseline intelligence capability to accomplish its anticipated mission, changes in the situation or mission tasking may require augmentation of this baseline capability. When a MAGTF is

committed to an operation, the intelligence assets of any remaining units in the operating forces can be called on to provide this augmentation. MAGTFs smaller than a full MEF will normally be supported by their parent MEF; a fully deployed MEF can be augmented by the assets of any other MEF. Augmentation may consist of providing entire intelligence units, selected equipment, or individual personnel with specialized skills. Support may also consist of providing intelligence products that cannot be developed by the deployed MAGTF or its supporting joint intelligence activity.

## **b. The Supporting Establishment**

Marine intelligence personnel and organizations of the supporting establishment enhance and sustain the intelligence activities of the operating forces.

### **(1) Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA).**

The Marine Corps maintains a Service-level intelligence capability in MCIA. MCIA focuses on crisis and pre-deployment support to expeditionary warfare. It complements the efforts of theater, other-Service, and national intelligence organizations and provides unique threat, technical, and geographic intelligence products that are tailored to Marine Corps operating forces preparing for deployment. It also coordinates Marine Corps Service collection, production, and dissemination requirements by acting as the Service collection, production, and dissemination manager. MCIA is collocated with the National Maritime Intelligence Center, Suitland, Maryland, and at Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia.

### **(2) Marine Corps Imagery Support Unit (MCISU).**

The MCISU provides national imagery analysis support to the operating forces, supporting establishment, and other commands as directed. Located at Camp Pendleton, California, the MCISU operates the only national imagery receipt location in the Marine Corps and is the sole source of primary national imagery receipt, processing, and exploitation for the Marine Corps. It provides contingency planning imagery intelligence support to the MARFORs and MAGTF CEs as well as support to major Service-level exercises.

**(3) Marine Support Battalion.** Marine Support Battalion provides Marine Corps participation in national and Department of the Navy (DON) cryptologic activities worldwide. These Marines perform tasks that are directly related to their military occupational specialty, contributing to the national, theater, and DON SIGINT collection, production, and dissemination effort while gaining invaluable skill maintenance and enhancement opportunities. Marine Support Battalion, collocated with the Naval Security Group, Ft. Meade, Maryland, augments the operating forces with trained SIGINT personnel during crises and exercises.

### **(4) Navy-Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC).**

The NMITC, Dam Neck, Virginia, provides training to Navy and Marine Corps personnel in basic, intermediate, and advanced intelligence methods and applications. During contingency operations, NMITC supports the operational forces through the provision of focused intelligence training via mobile training teams and/or through selective personnel augmentation.

**(5) Personnel Augmentation.** The supporting establishment is also a source of experienced intelligence personnel who can be called on to fill contingency billets in the intelligence structure of a deploying or committed MAGTF.

## **c. Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES)**

The mission of MARFORRES is to provide trained units and/or personnel to augment, reinforce, or reconstitute active duty MARFORs during times of war or national emergency. Intelligence capabilities of the Marine Corps Reserve are complementary to those of the active component. This includes individual mobilization augmentee (IMA) and individual ready reserve personnel as well as selected Marine Corps Reserve units, including two force reconnaissance companies, a SCAMP, an imagery interpretation unit, and several interrogator-translator and CI teams, which provide increased depth to limited active component capabilities. Additionally, IMA members of the Marine Corps Reserve Intelligence Program and the Marine Corps Reserve Cryptologic Program routinely support the training and operational activities of the active component.





## Chapter 5

# Intelligence Support to MAGTF Operations

*“Our world without the Cold War confrontation is a safer world, but it is not a Garden of Eden. Intelligence remains our basic national instrument for anticipating danger.”*

— George Bush

### 5001. Overview

Intelligence enables the planning and execution of successful operations. MAGTF operations are characterized by unity of effort, high tempo, timely decisionmaking, rapid execution, and the relentless exploitation of opportunities. Intelligence operations must have the flexibility, agility, and sustainability to support these types of operations. MAGTF operations are expeditionary operations and are conducted in accordance with the Marine Corps operational concepts of:

- Operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS)
- Sustained operations ashore
- MOOTW.

Each of these operational concepts presents unique challenges and considerations for intelligence support. In addition to joint operations, many MAGTF operations will be executed in conjunction with allies or coalition partners; intelligence activities in joint and multinational operations require special planning and coordination.

### 5002. Intelligence Support to OMFTS

OMFTS is characterized by:

- Focus on an operational objective
- Use of the sea as maneuver space
- Application of strength against weakness

- Creation of overwhelming tempo and momentum
- Emphasis on intelligence, deception, and flexibility
- Integration of all elements to accomplish the mission.

#### Operational Maneuver From the Sea

OMFTS is the maneuver of naval forces at the operational level that projects seabased power ashore to deal a decisive blow. OMFTS is a bold bid for victory that aims to exploit a significant enemy weakness. OMFTS embodies the application of the principles of maneuver warfare to a maritime campaign.

Success in OMFTS depends on the ability to seize fleeting opportunities and quickly take advantage of exposed enemy vulnerabilities. Deception, surprise, speed, and battlespace preparation are emphasized to create delay, uncertainty, and ineffectiveness in enemy actions. Intelligence provides the knowledge and understanding that enable the effective conduct of OMFTS.

#### a. Intelligence and OMFTS

OMFTS relies on intelligence to drive planning, option selection, and maneuver execution. To support OMFTS, intelligence operations must be conducted across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Starting with strategic considerations and working down to tactical dispositions, intelligence uncovers the

threat's centers of gravity, strengths, and weaknesses, thereby exposing critical vulnerabilities to be exploited by naval forces operating from the sea. Intelligence also assesses the potential for maneuver offered by the battlespace, including identifying entry points where the force can establish itself ashore.<sup>1</sup> Intelligence also provides the foundation for effective force protection and C2W efforts; these efforts help surprise, preempt, disrupt, and disorient the enemy during the execution of OMFTS.

## b. Required Intelligence Capabilities

The following intelligence capabilities are required to support OMFTS:

- Perform IPB and situation development covering a broad maneuver space.
- Analyze threat forces to determine centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.
- Conduct detailed terrain and hydrographic analysis to identify suitable entry points.
- Ensure connectivity and interoperability with national, theater, and joint forces' intelligence assets, which provide intelligence support before the arrival of naval forces in the objective area.
- Provide stand-off collection assets that are capable of satisfying force requirements from over the horizon.
- Provide organic imagery, SIGINT, HUMINT, CI, remote sensor, GI&S, and ground and aerial reconnaissance assets that are capable of satisfying MAGTF tactical collection requirements as the force transitions ashore.
- Provide responsive processing, exploitation, and production capabilities that can rapidly develop the critical intelligence required to support timely decisionmaking.

- Provide dissemination systems that link widely dispersed forces afloat and ashore.
- Provide flexible intelligence units and organizations that are capable of rapidly transitioning ashore with minimal degradation of support.
- Provide in-depth support to force protection and C2W activities.

## c. Intelligence Support During OMFTS Planning

**(1) Planning and Direction.** There are a number of unique intelligence considerations for OMFTS (see figure 5-1). During the planning phase, the MAGTF intelligence officer provides centralized direction for the intelligence efforts of the entire MAGTF. Navy and Marine intelligence assets operate together from an afloat amphibious task force intelligence center (ATFIC)<sup>2</sup>, which is normally located on the amphibious force flagship. Initial requirements are broad in scope and are aimed at providing a general description of the battlespace and the threat; as planning progresses, requirements become increasingly focused on uncovering critical vulnerabilities and providing intelligence that is relevant to the COAs under consideration. The intelligence flow will be predominately from the top down—from national and theater activities—until organic naval intelligence capabilities can be brought to bear. A comprehensive, systematic management effort is required to ensure that the necessary support is requested and received. At the same time, Navy and Marine intelligence officers must also develop detailed plans for the positioning and employment of the organic intelligence assets to support the concept of operations.

**(2) Collection.** Collection operations in the planning phase are conducted primarily by national and theater assets. These assets can collect information in denied areas without compromising operational security and/or perform their missions at significant stand-off distances. However, the small number of these systems and

<sup>1</sup> The term entry point encompasses beaches, boat landing sites, HLZs, and drop zones that can be used to establish elements of the force ashore.

<sup>2</sup> ATFIC is used in place of the term JIC, which was previously used to identify the Navy-Marine intelligence center onboard the amphibious task force flagship. Per Joint Pub 1-02, the JIC designation will be used only by a joint Service, theater-level intelligence center. The term ATFIC has been submitted for inclusion in the next editions of Joint Pub 1-02 and MCRP 5-2C (the Marine Corps supplement to Joint Pub 1-02).

| Intelligence Cycle Step                  | Key Considerations   |
|--|--|
| Planning and direction                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Centralized direction from ATFIC</li> <li>• Transitioning of key capabilities ashore</li> </ul>   |
| Collection                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Initial dependence on national/theater capabilities</li> <li>• Employment of organic assets in advance force/preassault operations</li> </ul> |
| Processing, exploitation, and production | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Broad-based effort focusing on entry points and enemy vulnerabilities</li> <li>• Extensive support to CI and C2W</li> </ul>                   |
| Dissemination                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Widely dispersed units afloat and ashore</li> <li>• Need for rapid intelligence flow to exploit fleeting opportunities</li> </ul>             |
| Utilization                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• COA selection shaped by intelligence</li> <li>• Choice of entry points, objectives, and targets driven by intelligence</li> </ul>             |

**Figure 5-1. Intelligence Considerations during OMFTS.**

inherent limitations on their capabilities normally result in the development of an incomplete intelligence picture. Advance force or preassault collection operations by naval assets will often be required to confirm and further develop the situation. An intensive intelligence effort must be provided in support of advance force or preassault operations; this intelligence support is required to select the proper targets for advance force or preassault collection operations, as well as to ensure that these activities do not reveal the intent of the overall operation.

### **(3) Processing, Exploitation, and Production.**

Initial production efforts are directed at providing an extensive description of the battlespace and threat. This description is required to focus the planning effort. Under the direction of the senior Navy and Marine intelligence officers, the MAGTF, GCE, ACE, CSSE, Navy amphibious staff, and flagship intelligence sections engage in a cooperative effort to develop intelligence products that support the entire force; individual intelligence sections will normally concentrate on their particular areas of expertise, thereby satisfying their units' requirements while contributing a broad-scope product to the general intelligence production effort. For example, the MAGTF G-2/AFC may focus on describing the battlespace and the enemy's C2, logistics, and reserves, while the GCE studies enemy ground forces, the ACE

looks at the air and air defense threats, and the flagship intelligence department concentrates on the naval and coastal defense threat. From this effort, the ATFIC provides a comprehensive IPB analysis, an intelligence estimate, and supporting intelligence studies and products. As the planning phase continues, production efforts concentrate on identifying enemy vulnerabilities to be exploited and providing estimates and other intelligence products to support the specific COAs that are under consideration.

In the final stages of the OMFTS planning process, the production effort shifts to development of mission-specific intelligence products that are focused on the selected COA(s). These products include IPB graphics, beach and HLZ studies, and target/objective area studies. In addition, an extensive all-source intelligence effort is conducted to support deception, OPSEC, psychological operations (PSYOP), and EW planning in accordance with the MAGTF commander's overall C2W strategy. During this stage, the production effort becomes increasingly decentralized as GCE, ACE, and CSSE intelligence sections focus on the specific requirements of their units. The MAGTF intelligence section continues to provide products to support the entire force, with efforts concentrated on those MAGTF elements designated as the main effort.

**(4) Dissemination.** Dissemination in OMFTS presents significant challenges. Naval forces can be widely dispersed and may not assemble until late in the planning phase, if at all. Advances in technology have improved the capability to disseminate information between forces afloat, but there continue to be limitations on the quantity and quality of intelligence that can be exchanged. In particular, dissemination systems will be taxed by the volume of intelligence products, especially critical graphic products, that must be distributed during the planning phase. Intelligence officers at all levels, working in coordination with unit operations and communications-information systems officers, must develop plans that provide for dissemination of key intelligence in a timely manner to all elements of the force. They must be particularly careful to include in these plans units located on ships that are not equipped with the latest C2 or intelligence systems.

**(5) Utilization.** During the planning phase, intelligence is used to develop and select COAs and prepare detailed plans for the implementation of the selected COA(s). After providing an initial orientation to the battlespace and the threat, the intelligence officer assists the commander and the staff in analyzing the enemy's strengths and weaknesses to identify centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities that can be exploited. COAs are developed that take advantage of identified weaknesses to accomplish the assigned objective. The intelligence effort is refined on the basis of the COAs under consideration, providing answers to IRs generated during COA development. The intelligence developed through this interactive process aids the commander in selecting a favorable COA. Once the COA is chosen, intelligence is used to shape the concept of operations and supporting plans. The designation of objectives; selection of entry means, points, and times; and identification of targets are all based primarily on intelligence. Particular attention is given to steps that preserve surprise and that preempt, disrupt, or disorient the enemy's response to our actions (e.g., force protection measures and C2W (physical destruction, military deception, OP-SEC, PSYOP, and EW) plans).

#### **d. Intelligence Support During OMFTS Execution.**

**(1) Planning and Direction.** During execution, the ATFIC will continue to act as the central node for the direction of the intelligence effort. As the operation unfolds, intelligence nodes can be established ashore to support units carrying out mission tasking. Depending on the nature and scope of the operation, most of the MAGTF intelligence structure can remain afloat, or all of it may transition ashore. Movement of significant portions of the MAGTF intelligence structure ashore must be planned in detail to ensure a rapid transition with minimal degradation of support capability. If it is fully established ashore, the MAGTF intelligence section becomes the central node for intelligence direction; the ATFIC acts in a supporting capacity and continues to provide connectivity and services that cannot be readily established ashore.

IRs that arise during execution are normally time-sensitive; intelligence direction must anticipate these requirements and establish a responsive collection, production, and dissemination structure to satisfy them. Designation of PIRs that are based on the results of IPB analysis, the commander's intent, and the concept of operations is critical. Using these factors to designate PIRs ensures that the intelligence effort remains focused on providing key intelligence to decisionmakers in a timely manner.

**(2) Collection.** Collection operations transition from dependence on national and theater capabilities to reliance primarily on organic assets. Collection activities are integrated with the concept of operations; the objective is to develop the intelligence required to make key decisions regarding maneuver, targeting, and future plans. Collection assets are focused on key areas that are associated with the scheme of maneuver, the location and development of critical targets, and combat assessment. In addition, the reports of units maneuvering through the battlespace and/or in contact with the enemy become a significant source of information during execution; this information must be transmitted to the appropriate intelligence section to help maintain situational awareness and refine the threat assessment. The MAGTF continues to employ national- and theater-level collection support against targets located deep in the area of influence and throughout the area of interest as well as against less time-sensitive requirements.

### (3) Processing, Exploitation, and Production.

Rapid processing and production of intelligence are emphasized to support timely decisionmaking. OMFTS depends on decisive action and the generation of rapid operational tempo to break the enemy's cohesion and ability to resist; intelligence sections must demonstrate the flexibility, agility, and responsiveness to quickly recognize enemy vulnerabilities and identify opportunities as they develop during the battle. *To do this, intelligence sections at all levels must be aware of ongoing tactical activities and potential enemy reactions.* They must be able to rapidly integrate all-source intelligence information with sensor data and combat reporting to develop and maintain a coherent picture of enemy dispositions and an assessment of enemy intentions. They must be able to convey this picture and assessment (preferably in graphic form) to commanders in time to exploit identified opportunities. In addition to supporting the ongoing battle, intelligence sections must also be fully engaged in planning for future operations—continuing IPB analysis, delivering combat assessment inputs and BDA results, satisfying new IRs, and participating in the decisionmaking process.

**(4) Dissemination.** Dissemination is an even greater challenge during OMFTS execution than during the planning phase. Intelligence developed during the processing, exploitation, and production step must be rapidly disseminated to the units that are able to act on that intelligence. These forces may be widely dispersed afloat, airborne, and ashore while engaging in rapid maneuver and contact with the enemy. The dissemination system must be flexible and reliable and must focus on the importance and the quality of the intelligence distributed rather than on its volume. Dissemination plans must provide alarm channels for warning data and must ensure that pathways remain open for passing critical intelligence that directly affects PIRs or identified decision points. Measures that can help to reduce the volume of intelligence traffic include:

- Limiting routine reporting
- Setting filters to eliminate information that is not pertinent to the tactical situation

- Establishing minimal reporting thresholds for the generation of intelligence reports
- Providing alternate means for collection and other intelligence support requests.

In addition, dissemination plans must permit two-way dissemination, providing a means for subordinate elements to pass along data, information, or intelligence that they collect or develop that identifies new enemy vulnerabilities or enhances situation development for the entire force.

**(5) Utilization.** Utilization of intelligence during the execution of OMFTS is rapid and decentralized. Intelligence is used to identify enemy vulnerabilities as the battle unfolds; once developed, this intelligence is quickly disseminated to the MAGTF elements that can act on it, thereby enhancing the ability of individual units to exploit opportunities as they arise. Through integration with operations, assets are positioned to develop new intelligence as the concept of operations is carried out and the enemy responds to our actions. Timely collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence provides commanders with an accurate picture of the battlespace and the ability to recognize new opportunities as they arise. Commanders use this intelligence to select branches and sequels to the COA, attack targets, protect their own forces, assess the results of their actions, and plan future operations.

## 5003. Intelligence Support to Sustained

### Sustained Operations Ashore

The employment of Marine Corps forces on land for an extended duration.

## Operations Ashore

### a. Intelligence and Sustained Operations Ashore

Sustained operations ashore require broad-based intelligence support that bridges the operational and tactical levels. Tactical plans are based on the results of operational-level intelligence assessments, which identify the enemy's centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities throughout the theater of operations. In

sustained operations ashore, MAGTF intelligence operations contribute to the operational-level assessments while translating the conclusions from these assessments into relevant tactical intelligence. Considerations for the development of intelligence in support of sustained operations ashore are similar to those for OMFTS; intelligence support during the execution of sustained operations ashore requires the same agility and responsiveness as in OMFTS, with the focus on providing critical intelligence to support timely decisionmaking. However, sustained operations ashore are normally conducted over a greater land area and with a larger force than in OMFTS, creating the requirement for a larger and more widely distributed intelligence support structure. The need for integration with theater, joint, multinational, and other-Service intelligence assets is also greater.

## **b. Required Intelligence Capabilities**

The following intelligence capabilities are required to support sustained operations ashore:

- Field and sustain intelligence structure to support MEF-level operations over extended periods.
- Execute all intelligence functions of a Service component headquarters, including full participation in theater or JTF intelligence activities.
- Ensure sufficient and reliable communications-information systems connectivity and interoperability with theater, joint, and other-Service intelligence assets participating in the operation.
- Conduct IPB and situation development in support of both operational- and tactical-level planning.
- Provide organic imagery, SIGINT, CI, HUMINT, remote sensor, GI&S, and ground and aerial reconnaissance assets that are capable of satisfying MAGTF tactical requirements.
- Provide processing, exploitation, and production capabilities that can supply the extensive products required to support MEF-level planning and execution.
- Provide dissemination systems that link widely dispersed and rapidly maneuvering forces.

- Provide area specialists and linguists with skills that are pertinent to the area of operations.
- Support force sustainment operations through the provision of detailed logistic intelligence.
- Support force protection efforts conducted throughout a large operating area, with emphasis on the security of critical rear area C2 and logistic facilities.

## **c. Intelligence Support to Sustained Operations Ashore**

**(1) Direction and Planning.** As in OMFTS, intelligence direction during sustained operations ashore will be centralized during the planning phase and increasingly decentralized during execution. IRs are extensive and cover all aspects of the threat and the battlespace. Comprehensive collection, production, and dissemination efforts will be required to satisfy these requirements; detailed management is necessary to ensure that these efforts are properly focused and integrated to meet the needs of the entire force. The MAGTF intelligence section will act as the primary intelligence node, developing intelligence to support the MAGTF commander, staff, and subordinate elements. The Marine component headquarters serves as the focal point for connectivity with the theater or JTF intelligence structure. During the planning phase, timeliness of intelligence production may not be as critical because the planning process for sustained operations ashore normally takes place over an extended period and offers the opportunity to use more time and resources to answer those requirements. (See figure 5-2.)

Once execution begins, the emphasis is on satisfaction of time-sensitive requirements to support both operational and tactical decisionmaking. Intelligence nodes will be created at selected times and places to provide tailored intelligence support to units executing specific phases or aspects of the concept of operations. During execution, intelligence direction must balance the support provided among close, deep, and rear operations as well as the support to current and future operations.

The intelligence structure required to support sustained operations ashore is normally more extensive than that

| Intelligence Cycle Step                  | Key Considerations  |
|--|---|
| Planning and direction                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MAGTF acting as central node</li> <li>• Need for broad intelligence structure with extensive liaison requirements</li> </ul>   |
| Collection                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Competition for national, theater, and JTF support</li> <li>• Reliance on organic assets to satisfy many tactical requirements</li> <li>• Support to battle damage assessment</li> </ul> |
| Processing, exploitation, and production | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Wide-scope effort that bridges operational and tactical levels</li> <li>• Importance of target and geographic intelligence</li> </ul>  |
| Dissemination                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extensive communications-information systems infrastructure</li> <li>• Widely dispersed units</li> <li>• Timely support</li> </ul>   |
| Utilization                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Need to integrate operational and tactical levels of intelligence and operations</li> <li>• Support to sustainability functions</li> </ul>   |

**Figure 5-2. Intelligence Considerations during Sustained Operations Ashore.**

used in other types of MAGTF operations. A detailed planning effort must be undertaken to ensure that the necessary assets are tasked, deployed, and positioned where and when they are required. Sustained operations ashore are frequently based on a theater CINC's approved operations plan or other standing contingency plans that include provisions for a baseline intelligence support structure; these plans must be adapted and tailored to the particulars of the current and projected operational situation. Intelligence plans use a building-block approach, phasing in capabilities to keep pace with the buildup of operational forces. *Planners must remain aware that intelligence capabilities must be in place to support the earliest steps of the planning phase; therefore, a robust intelligence structure is normally required in the initial stages of the deployment.*

Many of the intelligence activities conducted during sustained operations ashore will be joint; intelligence plans must provide for connectivity with the theater or joint and other component intelligence assets as well as for participation in theater or JTF intelligence mechanisms. An extensive liaison effort will be required to ensure that MAGTF IRs and operations are fully coordinated with those of joint and other-Service intelligence activities. The MARFOR and MAGTF will require significant personnel augmentation to meet the

broad scope of intelligence activities in sustained operations ashore and provide liaison teams to the numerous joint and supporting force intelligence agencies. This augmentation can be drawn from residual forces, the supporting establishment, or the Reserves.

**(2) Collection.** Sustained operations ashore will normally be supported by the full range of national- and theater-level collection capabilities as well as by the organic assets of the participating component forces. Collection priorities for national and theater assets will be determined by the JFC; the bulk of these assets will usually be targeted against overall theater/JTF objectives. Marines must participate in the joint collection management and production processes to ensure that MAGTF PIRs receive appropriate support from the theater/JTF level. However, even if MAGTF requirements are given priority, the results of national and theater collection operations cannot be relied on to completely satisfy the number of requirements developed during extended sustained operations ashore or to provide the level of detail needed for tactical planning and execution. For this reason, the MAGTF must depend on its organic collection assets to provide the bulk of its tactical intelligence information, particularly during the execution phase. The MAGTF must be prepared to plan and execute imagery, SIGINT,

HUMINT, ground reconnaissance, and CI force protection source operations throughout its area of operations; this includes collection activities in support of deep operations and the planning of future operations. MAGTF collection plans must be coordinated with those of higher, adjacent, and supporting commands to ensure that:

- All requirements receive adequate coverage
- Collection assets are employed efficiently with minimal overlaps
- Collection operations are sufficiently integrated to permit free exchange of collection targeting data and tracking of collection targets as they move through the battlespace.

### **(3) Processing, Exploitation, and Production.**

Processing, exploitation, and production efforts in support of sustained operations ashore parallel those for OMFTS. The scope of the initial production is broad, with the focus narrowing as particular COAs are selected and a concept of operations is developed. In sustained operations ashore, geographic intelligence production takes on added importance. Geographic intelligence helps to identify opportunities for ground and air maneuver as well as to determine line-of-sight profiles for observation, weapons employment, and the effective use of communications-electronic equipment. Mapping enhancements, lines-of-communications studies, and IPB graphics (such as cross-country mobility, weather effects, and combined obstacle overlays) are key intelligence products that support sustained operations ashore. Threat analysis must be comprehensive and generally deals with large ground and air formations. This analysis covers reserves as well as committed forces and must take into account all factors that affect the enemy's ability to fight at the operational and tactical levels, including leadership, doctrine, training, readiness, and sustainability. In addition, an extensive production effort is devoted to supporting CSS operations. The main components of this effort are studies on the local climate, infrastructure, and resources as well as on the threat to our rear area and lines of communications. Products from national, theater, and JTF intelligence agencies contribute to the production effort, but many of these products will have to be tailored by the

AFC and GCE, ACE, and CSSE intelligence sections to satisfy particular MAGTF requirements. During execution, emphasis is placed on rapid processing and production of tactical intelligence to support decisionmaking in the current battle, while at the same time providing detailed intelligence to shape plans for future operations.

**(4) Dissemination.** The ability to develop and maintain a shared picture of the battlespace among the diverse components of the joint force is essential to the successful execution of sustained operations ashore. MAGTF and Marine component dissemination architectures not only must provide for the distribution of intelligence within the MAGTF, but also must permit the timely exchange of intelligence with the theater or JTF headquarters, other component commands, and both adjacent and supporting units. Marine intelligence architectures must be fully integrated with the theater or JTF structures; this requires detailed planning and coordination because each theater and JTF has a unique architecture and sometimes separate channels are used for the dissemination of finished intelligence, imagery, SIGINT, HUMINT, and CI information. Dissemination during the early phases is normally simplified by establishing a reliable, redundant communications system between fixed or semifixed CPs. However, even a robust communications system will be challenged by the requirement to distribute a large volume of maps, imagery, and other graphic products during the planning stage.

During execution, the dissemination challenges in sustained operations ashore are similar to those of OMFTS, that is, ensuring the rapid distribution of time-sensitive, mission-critical intelligence to widely dispersed units on the move or in contact with the enemy. A number of techniques can be used to prevent the loss of intelligence that is needed for timely decisionmaking in the stream of intelligence data and information. Among them are:

- Establishment of alarm dissemination channels
- Use of broadcast mode for specialized intelligence reporting



- Employment of direct support teams or designation of a specific element of the intelligence section as a dissemination team
- Linking dissemination to factors developed in the other phases of intelligence development, such as PIRs, named areas of interest, high-value targets, and high-payoff targets.

Particular attention must be given to the distribution of updated imagery and graphic intelligence products to units that cannot be supported from fixed or semifixed intelligence support nodes.

**(5) Utilization.** The use of intelligence in sustained operations ashore follows the same principles as its use in OMFTS. The difference lies in the scope of the effort required and the need to integrate intelligence and operations simultaneously at multiple levels: theater or JTF, MARFOR, MAGTF, MSC, and tactical units (regiments/groups/battalions/squadrons/detachments).

In sustained operations ashore, intelligence is used to formulate both operational and tactical plans that will accomplish campaign objectives. Broad-based strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence on the enemy and the area of operations is used by intelligence and operational planners in an interactive process to identify centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities that can be attacked or exploited to achieve the campaign objectives. This in turn leads to COA development, selection, and refinement, an effort that must be coordinated and integrated from the theater/JTF down to the tactical level. Intelligence is used to help determine the main and supporting efforts; to designate objectives, times, and locations for these efforts; and to identify the support required for each to succeed. During execution, intelligence is used to develop the situation, supporting decisions on whether to continue or modify the plan as well as whether to exploit success or take advantage of new opportunities. At the same time, intelligence facilitates the planning of follow-on operations through support to combat assessment and the provision of continuing IPB analysis. In addition, intelligence is used to plan and conduct critical sustainability functions, contributing key logistic intelligence and force protection recommendations.

## 5004. Intelligence Support to MOOTW

### Military Operations Other Than War

MOOTW refers to the conduct of Marine and naval expeditionary operations across the range of military operations short of war. MOOTW encompass a wide variety of activities intended to deter war, resolve conflict, promote peace, and support civil authorities.

### a. Intelligence and MOOTW

MOOTW encompass a broad range of missions and tasks, each of which has its own unique IRs. (See figure 5-3.)

Intelligence activities in MOOTW are routinely characterized by:

- The initial lack of detailed intelligence databases on the area of operations
- An extensive list of nonstandard IRs that must be satisfied to support planning and execution

### MOOTW Missions

Disaster relief

Noncombatant evacuation operations

Maritime intercept operations

Shows of force

Strikes and raids

Peace operations

Support to counterdrug operations

Humanitarian assistance

Recovery operations

**Figure 5-3. Examples of MOOTW Missions.**

- A rapidly changing situation resulting from crisis conditions in the area of operations
- A compressed time frame for intelligence development
- Restrictions on collection operations.

Intelligence shapes operations during MOOTW as it does during other types of expeditionary operations. However, in addition to understanding the physical environment and the threat, the commander must have intelligence on political, economic, and sociological conditions to develop sound military plans that will accomplish the assigned mission.

To support MOOTW, Marine intelligence operations and supporting assets must be maintained in a high state of readiness. MAGTF intelligence sections must focus on areas with the greatest potential for the execution of contingency operations and must be able to respond with minimal warning and preparation. They must also have the flexibility to adapt to the wide variety of potential missions, possessing the expertise and specialized capabilities to provide intelligence across the entire scope of MOOTW.

## b. Required Intelligence Capabilities

The following intelligence capabilities are required to support MOOTW:

- Forward-deployed intelligence sections that are manned, trained, and equipped to respond to a variety of short-notice contingency operations
- Deployable intelligence assets that can be rapidly “surged” to augment the capabilities of a forward-deployed MAGTF committed to a MOOTW
- Specialized knowledge concerning infrastructure, political, economic, cultural, and sociological conditions in a variety of geographic areas
- The ability to perform IPB and situation development that is focused on unconventional threat

forces, such as security forces, paramilitary groups, insurgents, and terrorists

- Organic CI and HUMINT capability that is prepared for operation in a variety of MOOTW scenarios
- SIGINT assets that can collect information from nontraditional targets
- Dissemination systems that link widely dispersed forces
- Connectivity to national, theater, joint, and multinational force intelligence assets for provision of intelligence support during both planning and execution
- Area specialists and linguists with skills that are pertinent to the area of operations
- Expertise in the operations and functioning of non-Department of Defense (DOD) government agencies, international coalitions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).<sup>3</sup>

## c. Intelligence Support to MOOTW

**(1) Direction and Planning.** As with OMFTS, there are certain unique intelligence considerations during MOOTW (see figure 5-4). Direction of the intelligence effort in MOOTW will generally be highly decentralized. During MOOTW, MAGTF elements can be spread across a wide area, each with a different mission and facing a unique situation. While a central node will be needed to direct the efforts of MAGTF intelligence assets and coordinate external support for the force, the bulk of intelligence will be provided by subordinate intelligence sections supporting their individual units. Consideration should be given to directing the intelligence effort on an area-support rather than a unit-support basis; in an area-support system, intelligence nodes are created to support all units operating in the designated area. IRs will be extensive and diverse; many will deal with topics and threats that are not normally confronted during conventional operations. Individual intelligence sections and nodes must be provided

<sup>3</sup> An NGO is a transnational organization of private citizens that maintains a consultative status with the United Nations. NGOs may be professional associations, foundations, businesses, or groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance. Examples include the Red Cross and the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE).

| Intelligence Cycle Step                  | Key Considerations  |
|--|---|
| Planning and direction                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decentralized direction</li> <li>• Need for multiple intelligence support nodes with specialized capabilities</li> </ul>                                     |
| Collection                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nonstandard requirements</li> <li>• Importance of HUMINT, CI, and nontraditional collection activities</li> </ul>  |
| Processing, exploitation, and production | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focus on infrastructure, political, economic, and sociological factors</li> <li>• Use of nonstandard production formats</li> </ul>                           |
| Dissemination                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Large number of independent units operating throughout the area</li> <li>• Intelligence exchange with joint, multinational, and nonmilitary units</li> </ul> |
| Utilization                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Need to monitor effectiveness and effect of ongoing operations</li> <li>• Support to force protection, civil affairs, PSYOP, and sustainability</li> </ul>   |

**Figure 5-4. Intelligence Factors in MOOTW.**

with expertise or with access to resources that can satisfy these nonstandard requirements.

MOOTW are often generated as a result of fast-moving crisis situations. Intelligence plans must emphasize readiness and flexibility to respond to MOOTW requirements in a timely manner. MAGTF intelligence sections at all levels must maintain an awareness of potential contingency missions and adopt a “lean forward” approach toward anticipating requirements. Forward-deployed MAGTFs must possess all required intelligence capabilities to function in a wide variety of MOOTW missions. The active Marine Service components (Marine Forces Atlantic or Pacific) must be prepared to rapidly deploy additional or specialized assets to augment the capabilities of the forward-deployed MAGTF.

In planning the intelligence structure required to support a particular MOOTW, several factors must be considered. First, the MAGTF intelligence section, whether afloat or ashore, must have connectivity to all supporting external intelligence agencies. Second, it is often necessary to augment subordinate intelligence sections to provide an enhanced capability to support

the independent activities of their units. Finally, there are normally extensive contacts with organizations outside the U.S. military command structure during MOOTW; liaison and information exchange with non-DOD agencies and NGOs as well as multinational and/or host nation military and security forces must be anticipated.

**(2) Collection.** Because MOOTW present nontraditional targets, collection operations in MOOTW must blend the capabilities and limitations of all available assets. Satisfaction of unique MOOTW requirements often requires the use of specialized capabilities or innovative approaches to the employment of standard assets. During the planning and initial phases of the operation, national and theater assets will be relied on to satisfy basic requirements concerning entry points, infrastructure, and conventional aspects of the threat. Because supporting intelligence agencies often have limited capabilities in MOOTW situations, organic assets are brought to bear as early as possible, including being employed as part of the advance party or lead element of the force. The nature of the MOOTW environment, threat, and requirements often presents a lucrative opportunity for the conduct of HUMINT and

CI collections operations. A MAGTF committed to a MOOTW must have a robust CI and HUMINT capability, augmented by appropriate area specialist and linguist support. This capability should be deployed as soon as practical to initiate force protection collection operations and establish necessary liaisons. The MAGTF must also exploit open sources and maintain contact with non-DOD government agencies and NGOs.

### **(3) Processing, Exploitation, and Production.**

Intelligence production requirements in MOOTW are normally focused on nontraditional subject areas. For example, detailed knowledge of the host nation's economic, transportation, medical, and public works infrastructure will be required to develop plans for humanitarian assistance operations, while a threat study to support a peacekeeping mission must encompass an extensive treatment of political, cultural, and sociological factors related to various insurgent or paramilitary factions in addition to the threat's military capabilities. Use of area specialists and expertise from external intelligence organizations, non-DOD agencies (State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, etc.), and NGOs is crucial to satisfying these requirements. Production formats must be adapted to the requirements of a particular situation; normal IPB analysis must be modified to highlight factors crucial to the specific MOOTW mission. In addition, processing and production in MOOTW must be responsive to the needs of the numerous small elements that are conducting independent activities throughout the area of operations. Production in support of these elements must be tailored to specific mission requirements and provide details pertinent to the small-unit level. Intelligence that increases the situational awareness of individual Marines, such as information on local customs, language, and health and sanitation, is an important part of this effort.

**(4) Dissemination.** Dissemination during MOOTW must provide for the timely distribution of intelligence to a large number of elements that are widely dispersed throughout the area of operations. Creation of intelligence support nodes for a specific area or region will aid the dissemination effort, but only if these nodes are equipped to receive all-source intelligence, in particular

imagery and graphic products, from supporting collection and production agencies. Additional communications-information systems support as well as the establishment of a dedicated courier service will normally be required to support the dissemination effort. Dissemination plans must also include provisions for the exchange of intelligence with other-Service and multinational units participating in the operation, non-DOD agencies, and NGOs. Issues of interoperability, sanitation, declassification, and releasability must all be considered and determined before such exchanges can occur.

**(5) Utilization.** Intelligence shapes the planning and execution of MOOTW just as it does in other types of operations. During planning, intelligence helps to determine the nature and scope of the operations and tasks required to accomplish the mission, the size and type of forces required, and the location and duration of the effort required. During execution, intelligence is used to enhance the effectiveness of ongoing operations, assess the results of completed activities, and identify follow-on missions and tasks that will help to accomplish the overall objective. Emphasis is also placed on intelligence support of specialized functions that have enhanced importance during MOOTW: logistics, force protection, civil affairs, and PSYOP.

## **5005. Intelligence Support in Joint Operations**

### **Joint Operations**

Joint operations is "a general term used to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces." (Joint Pub 1-02) (Note: A Navy/Marine Corps operation is not a joint operation.)

### **Joint Force**

Joint force is "a general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single JFC." (Joint Pub 1-02)

MARFORs participate in full partnership with other Services in joint operations. A coordinated intelligence effort makes a critical contribution to the success of joint operations. During joint operations, Marine intelligence operations are fully integrated with joint intelligence activities to ensure unity of effort, mutual support, and effective employment of limited intelligence resources.

### a. Keys to Effective Intelligence Support in Joint Operations

Effective intelligence support in joint operations depends on:

- Agreement on policies and procedures
- Mutual intelligence support
- Shared intelligence capabilities and assets
- Full interoperability and connectivity among participants
- Robust liaison.

### b. Joint Intelligence Operations

**(1) Responsibilities.** JFCs are responsible for all aspects of intelligence support within their commands. JFCs have the responsibility and authority to determine, direct, and coordinate all mission-related collection and analysis activities through centralized or apportioned collection and production management efforts. Component commanders remain responsible for the intelligence function within their commands and use organic intelligence capabilities to support their assigned missions. The JFC makes national, theater, and joint force intelligence assets available to support the efforts of the component commanders. At the same time, component capabilities must be available to assist the joint intelligence effort.

**(2) Joint Intelligence Structure.** The JFC is assisted in carrying out intelligence responsibilities by the joint force J-2. The J-2 exercises many of the JFC's intelligence functions while acting as the senior

intelligence officer in the joint force. The intelligence assets of the joint force headquarters are consolidated in a Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE)<sup>4</sup>. The JISE provides intelligence support to the JFC and the entire joint force. Marine intelligence specialists will be assigned to the JISE to articulate Marine capabilities and requirements, influence decisions, and optimize intelligence support to the Marine component. Key functions performed by the JISE include:


- Centralized collection, production, and dissemination management for joint force and supporting intelligence assets
- All-source intelligence production to satisfy JFC and component requirements
- Development and maintenance of databases that support planning, operations, and targeting
- Production of target studies and materials
- Providing access to supporting national and theater intelligence assets.

Each theater establishes its own intelligence architecture, providing connectivity between the national- and theater-level intelligence organizations, the JTF, and its component commands. MARFOR and MAGTF intelligence architectures must be able to plug into the architectures of any theater in which they might be employed. A representative joint intelligence architecture is shown in figure 5-5 (see next page).

**(3) Procedures.** Joint intelligence activities are governed by joint intelligence doctrine contained in Joint Pub 2-0, *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations*, and supporting manuals in the 2 series of joint publications. Joint intelligence doctrine is supplemented by combatant commanders' tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for intelligence developed by each theater command. During joint operations, Marine intelligence activities will adhere to joint doctrine and any published theater TTP pertaining to that operation.

### c. Marine Responsibilities in Joint Intelligence Operations

<sup>4</sup> The combatant (theater) command is supported by a JIC, which is a standing intelligence element. A JISE is a temporary agency established to provide support to a particular JTF.



Marine intelligence sections and units participating in joint operations must:

- Operate in accordance with joint intelligence doctrine, theater TTP, and individual JTF procedures
- Participate in joint intelligence mechanisms for the coordination of collection management, intelligence production, HUMINT and SIGINT collection operations, target intelligence support, intelligence architectures, CI activities and collection operations, and other intelligence operations
- Provide intelligence support to the joint force headquarters or other JTF components as directed
- Contribute personnel and other assets to augment the J-2 section and JISE if requested
- Employ joint or other component intelligence assets supporting Marine operations
- Enter the JTF intelligence architecture

- Exchange liaison elements with the J-2, JISE, and/or other JTF components as required.

#### d. The MARFOR Headquarters or MAGTF CE as a JTF Headquarters

In certain situations, particularly in MOOTW, a Marine component headquarters or a MAGTF CE may be designated to provide the nucleus of a JTF headquarters. In this case, the MARFOR or MAGTF G-2 must be prepared to function as the JTF J-2, with the G-2's intelligence section serving as the base for the establishment of a JISE. To carry out this function, MARFOR and MEF G-2 sections must prepare plans for operating as a JTF J-2 and conduct the training necessary to be able to execute these plans. Plans should be based on joint doctrine and theater TTPs and should include J-2/JISE organization, personnel and equipment requirements (with their augmentation sources), a baseline intelligence architecture, and standing operating procedures. Each MARFOR and MEF G-2 section

should establish a standing JTF intelligence planning cell that is made up of intelligence specialists who are knowledgeable in joint force and other-Service intelligence capabilities, limitations, and operating procedures to develop these plans.

### 5006. Intelligence Support in Multinational Operations

MARFORs may participate in a wide variety of multinational operations, ranging from routine bilateral exercises to coalition warfare in major regional contingencies. Instances of unilateral U.S. military operations are becoming less frequent, particularly in MOOTW. Marine units must be prepared to carry out intelligence operations in the context of multinational operations.

#### Multinational Operations

Multinational operations are “military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance.” (Joint Pub 1-02)

#### a. Multinational Intelligence Operations

There is no single intelligence doctrine for multinational operations. Each coalition or alliance must develop its own doctrine; the coalition commander determines standardized procedures for coalition forces.<sup>5</sup> Joint intelligence doctrine and architectures provide a framework for developing the multinational intelligence support structure. Multinational intelligence operations are based on the following principles:

- **Maintain unity of effort.** Intelligence operations must be directed at the common threat; a threat to one alliance member should be considered a threat to all.
- **Make adjustments.** Effective multinational operations require minimizing the differences in national concepts of intelligence support. Com-

manders and their intelligence officers must be willing to make adjustments to national procedures to facilitate the sharing of intelligence and the integration of intelligence operations. Special arrangements should be considered for developing, communicating, and using intelligence where there are differences in nations’ language, culture, doctrine, terminology, organization, and equipment.

- **Plan early and concurrently.** Multinational forces’ IRs and procedures should be identified, planned for, coordinated, and exercised before the execution of operations.
- **Share all necessary intelligence.** Each member of the coalition should share intelligence that supports the planning and execution of coalition operations. However, information about intelligence sources and methods should not be shared unless absolutely necessary. The methodology for exchanging intelligence should be developed and exercised before operations begin. Authorization for foreign disclosure should be obtained and procedures for sanitation and declassification should be developed as part of this planning process. During execution, the exchange must be monitored and adapted to ensure that it is meeting the needs of all coalition partners.
- **Conduct complementary intelligence operations.** Each nation’s intelligence assets should be used to capitalize on their strengths and offset the weaknesses of other members’ assets, providing the coalition with the most effective blend of capabilities.

#### b. Marine Intelligence in Multinational Operations

When participating in multinational operations, Marine intelligence activities will follow the principles outlined above, as well as guidance found in Joint Pub 2-0 and other joint and theater intelligence directives. Most potential allies will not possess the range of U.S. intelligence capabilities; therefore, U.S. intelligence sections

<sup>5</sup> NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs) and quadripartite standing agreements between U.S., British, Canadian, and Australian forces provide standards and guidance for the conduct of military operations by forces in these alliances. STANAG 2936 governs intelligence operations.

must expect to take the lead in developing intelligence during multinational operations. Particular attention must be given to provisions for sanitation, declassification, and releasability of intelligence developed by U.S. forces and agencies to coalition partners. Personnel who are knowledgeable in these techniques and procedures must be included in the MAGTF or Marine component intelligence section during multinational operations. In addition, intelligence plans must provide for connectivity with multinational forces and liaison

elements with appropriate linguistic and area specialist skills.



## Appendix A

# Glossary

### Section I Acronyms

**Note:** Acronyms change over time in response to new operational concepts, capabilities, doctrinal changes and other similar developments. The following publications are the sole authoritative sources for official military acronyms:

1. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

2. FMFRP 0-14, Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. (This publication is being updated and will be published during fiscal year 1998 with the new designator of MCRP 5-2C.)

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ACE ..... aviation combat element  
AFC ..... all-source fusion center  
ATFIC ..... amphibious task force intelligence center

BDA ..... battle damage assessment

C2 ..... command and control  
C2W ..... command and control warfare  
CCIR ..... commander's critical information requirements

CE ..... command element  
CI ..... counterintelligence  
CIC ..... combat intelligence center  
CINC ..... commander in chief  
COA ..... course of action  
COG ..... center of gravity  
CP ..... command post  
CSS ..... combat service support  
CSSE ..... combat service support element

CV ..... critical vulnerability

DOD ..... Department of Defense  
DON ..... Department of the Navy

EEFI ..... essential elements of friendly information  
EW ..... electronic warfare

FFIR ..... friendly force information requirements  
FIIU ..... force imagery interpretation unit  
FMFM ..... Fleet Marine Force manual  
FSCC ..... fire support coordination center

GCE ..... ground combat element  
GI&S ..... geospatial information and services

HLZ ..... helicopter landing zone  
HUMINT ..... human intelligence

I&W ..... indications and warning  
ICR ..... intelligence collection requirement  
IDR ..... intelligence dissemination requirement  
IMA ..... individual mobilization augmentee  
IMINT ..... imagery intelligence  
IPB ..... intelligence preparation of the battlespace  
IPR ..... intelligence production requirement  
IR ..... intelligence requirement

JFC ..... joint force commander  
JIC ..... joint intelligence center  
JISE ..... joint intelligence support element  
JTF ..... joint task force

MAGTF ..... Marine air-ground task force  
MARFOR ..... Marine Corps forces  
MARFORRES ..... Marine Forces Reserve

MASINT ..... measurement and signature intelligence  
MAW ..... Marine aircraft wing  
MC&G ..... mapping, charting, and geodesy  
MCDP ..... Marine Corps doctrinal publication  
MCIA ..... Marine Corps Intelligence Activity  
MCISU ..... Marine Corps Imagery Support Unit  
MCWP ..... Marine Corps warfighting publication  
MEF ..... Marine expeditionary force  
MEU ..... Marine expeditionary unit  
MOOTW ..... military operations other than war  
MSC ..... major subordinate command

NGO ..... nongovernmental organization  
NMITC ..... Navy-Marine Corps Intelligence  
Training Center

OCAC ..... operations control and analysis center  
OMFTS ..... operational maneuver from the sea  
OODA ..... observe, orient, decide, and act  
OP ..... observation post  
OPCON ..... operational control  
OPSEC ..... operations security  
OSINT ..... open-source intelligence

PDE&A ..... planning, decision, execution, and  
assessment  
PIR ..... priority intelligence requirements  
PSYOP ..... psychological operations

SA ..... situational awareness  
SARC ..... surveillance and reconnaissance center  
SCAMP ..... sensor control and management platoon  
SIGINT ..... signals intelligence  
SRIG ..... Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and  
Intelligence Group  
SSU ..... SIGINT support unit  
STANAG ..... standardization agreement

TRAP ..... tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel  
TTP ..... tactics, techniques, and procedures

UAV ..... unmanned aerial vehicle

## Section II

### Definitions

**Note:** Definitions of military terms change over time in response to new operational concepts, capabilities, doctrinal changes and other similar developments. The following publications are the sole authoritative sources for official definitions of military terms:

1. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

2. FMFRP 0-14, Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. (This publication is being updated and will be published during fiscal year 1998 with the new designator of MCRP 5-2C.)

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#### A

**all-source intelligence** - Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information, including, most frequently, human resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open source data, in the production of finished intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

#### B

**battle damage assessment** - 1. The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. Also called BDA. (Joint Pub 1-02) 2. The timely and accurate estimate of the damage resulting from the application of military force. BDA estimates physical damage to a particular target, functional damage to that target, and the capability of the entire target system to continue its operations. (MCWP 2-1)

#### C

**centers of gravity** - 1. Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called COG. (Joint Pub 1-02) 2. A key source of strength without which an enemy cannot function. (MCDP 1-2)

**collection** - The gathering of intelligence data and information to satisfy the identified requirements. (MCWP 2-1)

**collection management** - 1. The process of converting intelligence requirements into collection requirements, establishing priorities, and tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results and retasking, as required. (Joint Pub 1-02) 2. Its purpose is to conduct an effective effort to collect all necessary data while ensuring the efficient use of limited and valuable collection assets. (MCWP 2-1)

**combat data** - Data derived from reporting by operational units. (MCWP 2-1)

**command and control** - 1. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (Joint Pub 1-02) 2. The means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. (MCDP 6)

**commander's critical information requirements** - Information regarding the enemy and friendly activities and the environment identified by the commander as critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and facilitating timely decisionmaking. Also called CCIR. (Proposed definition for MCRP 5-2C)

**commander's intent** - A commander's clear, concise personal articulation of the reason(s) behind one or more tasks assigned to a subordinate. It is one of two components of every mission statement which supports the higher and/or supported commander's intent and guides the exercise of initiative in the absence of instructions. (Proposed definition for MCRP 5-2C)

**counterintelligence** - Within the Marine Corps, CI constitutes active and passive measures intended to deny a threat force valuable information about the friendly situation, to detect and neutralize hostile intelligence collection, and to deceive the enemy as to friendly capabilities and intentions. Also called CI. (MCWP 2-1)

**critical vulnerability** - An aspect of a center of gravity that if exploited will do the most significant damage to an adversary's ability to resist. Also called CV. (Proposed definition for MCRP 5-2C)

## D

**descriptive intelligence** - Class of intelligence which describes existing and previously existing conditions intended to promote situational awareness.

Descriptive intelligence has two components: *basic intelligence*, which is general background knowledge about established and relatively constant conditions; and *current intelligence*, which is concerned with describing the existing situation. (Proposed definition for MCRP 5-2C)

**dissemination** - Conveyance of intelligence to users in a suitable form. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**dissemination management** - Involves establishing dissemination priorities, selecting dissemination means, and monitoring the flow of intelligence throughout the command. The objective of dissemination management is to deliver the required intelligence to the appropriate user in proper form at the right time while ensuring that individual consumers and the dissemination system are not overloaded by attempting to move unneeded or irrelevant information. Dissemination management also provides for use of security controls that do not impede the timely delivery or subsequent use of intelligence while protecting intelligence sources and methods. (MCWP 2-1)

## E

**estimative intelligence** - Class of intelligence which attempts to anticipate future possibilities and probabilities based upon descriptive intelligence in the context of planned enemy and friendly operations. (Proposed definition for MCRP 5-2C)

## H

**human intelligence** - 1. A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. (Joint Pub 1-02) 2. HUMINT operations cover a wide range of activities encompassing reconnaissance patrols, aircrew reports and debriefs, debriefing of refugees, interrogations of prisoners of war, and the conduct of CI force protection source operations. Also called HUMINT. (MCWP 2-1)

## I

**imagery intelligence** - Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. Also called IMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**indications and warning** - Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United States or allied military, political, or economic interests or to US citizens abroad. It includes forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities; insurgency; nuclear/non-nuclear attack on the United States, its overseas forces, or allied nations; hostile reactions to United States reconnaissance activities; terrorists' attacks; and other similar events. Also called I&W. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**intelligence** - 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (Joint Pub 1-02) 3. Knowledge of the enemy and the surrounding environment that is needed to support decisionmaking. (MCDP 2)

**intelligence cycle** - The steps by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**intelligence data** - Data derived from assets primarily dedicated to intelligence collection: imagery systems, electronic

intercept equipment, human intelligence sources, and so on. (MCWP 2-1)

**intelligence discipline** - A well-defined area of intelligence collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources. There are five major disciplines: human intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence (communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence), and open-source intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**intelligence operations** - The variety of intelligence tasks that are carried out by various intelligence organizations and activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**intelligence preparation of the battlespace** - 1. An analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive data base for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. The data base is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuing process. Also called IPB. (Joint Pub 1-02) 2. A systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. (MCWP 2-1)

**intelligence requirement** - 1. Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information, or the production of intelligence. Also called IR. (Joint Pub 1-02) 2. Questions about the enemy and the environment, the answers to which a commander requires to make sound decisions. (MCDP 2)

## J

**joint force** - A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint intelligence center** - The intelligence center of the joint force headquarters. The joint intelligence center is responsible for providing and producing the intelligence required to support the joint force commander and staff, components, task forces and elements, and the national intelligence community. Also called JIC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint operations** - A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

## M

**main effort** - The designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to the overall mission success. (Proposed definition for MCRP 5-2C)

**maneuver warfare** - A warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. (MCDP 1)

**measurement and signature intelligence** - 1. Scientific and technical intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the target. The detected feature may be either reflected or emitted. Also called MASINT. (Joint Pub 1-02) 2. Intelligence information gathered by technical instruments such as radars, passive electro-optical sensors, radiation detectors, and remote ground sensors. (MCWP 2-1)

## O

**open-source intelligence** - 1. Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public. Also called OSINT. (Joint Pub 1-02) 2. OSINT sources include books, magazines, newspapers, maps, commercial electronic networks and databases, and radio and television broadcasts. OSINT involves no information that is classified at its origin or acquired through controlled collection. (MCWP 2-1)

## P

**priority intelligence requirements** - 1. Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decisionmaking. Also called PIR. (Jt Pub 1-02) 2. An intelligence requirement

associated with a decision that will critically affect the overall success of the command's mission. (MCDP 2)

**production management** - Encompasses determining the scope, content, and format of each product; developing a plan and schedule for the development of each product; as-

signing priorities among the various IPRs; allocating processing, exploitation, and production resources; and integrating production efforts with collection and dissemination. (MCWP 2-1)

## S

**sensor data** - Data derived from sensors whose primary mission is surveillance or target acquisition: air surveillance radars, counterbattery radars, and remote ground sensors. (MCWP 2-1)

**signals intelligence** - 1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronics, and foreign instrumentation signals. Also called SIGINT (Joint Pub 1-02)

**situational awareness** - Knowledge and understanding of the current situation which provides timely, relevant and accurate assessment of friendly, enemy and other operations within the battlespace. Also called SA. (Proposed definition for MCRP 5-2C)

## T

**tactical intelligence** - 1. Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting tactical operations. (Joint Pub 1-02) 2. Tactical intelligence concerns itself primarily with the location, capabilities, and possible intentions of enemy units on the battlefield and with the tactical aspects of terrain and weather. (MCDP 2)

## W

**warfighting functions** - The six mutually supporting military activities integrated in the conduct of all military operations: command and control, intelligence, maneuver, fires, logistics, and force protection. (Proposed definition for MCRP 5-2C)